CHAPTER 6

Self as Cultural Mode of Being

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Culturally inspired approaches to psychology have flourished during the last two decades (Bruner, 1990; Cole, 1996; D’Andrade, 1995; Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Greenfield, Keller, & Fuligini, 2003; Lehman, Chiu, & Shaller, 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shore, 1996; Shweder, 2003; Triandis, 1995). These approaches have covered a wide range of territory from basic perception and attention (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), emotion and motivation (Kitayama & Markus, 1994; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992), and all the way up to social institutions and organizational behavior (Earley, 1989; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Although cultural issues are traditionally studied by anthropologists using ethnography as a primary method, in more recent years they have been examined in increasing quantity and quality by psychologists with their traditional methods of cross-cultural surveys and experiments (e.g., Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Although informed significantly by ethnographic knowledge, these methods bring to the field more rigorous and consensually verifiable means by which to assess hypotheses suggested by in-depth observations of culture and, moreover, to determine certain boundary conditions for the hypotheses (Cohen, Chapter 8, this volume).

From the very outset of this psychologically oriented work on culture, the notion of self has been central in defining issues, formulating questions, and theoretically integrating a great variety of empirical findings (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Marsella, DeVos, & Hsu, 1985; Shweder & Bourne, 1982; Triandis, 1989). Two fundamental insights have emerged from this analysis. The first is the time-honored idea of the self as a social product (Cooley, 1902/1922; Mead, 1934). Humans, in this view, are social and cultural animals (Aronson, 1992; Baumeister, 2005); that is, the self is made possible through symbolically mediated, collaborative social interaction among many individuals in a given cultural community. Second, researchers have begun to realize that the self is best conceptualized as a psychological system for behavioral regulation (Kitayama & Duffy, 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 2004). This system, moreover, is not merely an organization of conceptual schemas on which to reflect back on. More importantly, it is providing a principle for one’s spontaneous behavioral organization or his or her modus operandi. In
other words, the self is a matter of "I" as well as "me" (Mead, 1934).

MUTUAL CONSTITUTION OF CULTURE AND SELF

The idea that "I"—the active agent—is a social product can be articulated most clearly by referring to earlier theorists in the symbolic interactionist school of social psychology such as Mead (1934) and Cooley (1902/1922), according to whom the self is seen as a set of behavioral response tendencies that are coordinated with response tendencies of social others in the cultural community. In early years of life, before children reach school age, social others are limited largely to mothers and other caregivers. But once in school, the child's world is dramatically expanded to include peers. This added dimension of sociality is likely to serve as a much needed impetus to achieve a generalized conception of how social others in general (i.e., the generalized other; Mead, 1934) act and respond to the self. Patterns of others' responses are recognized, and response tendencies of the self are thereby coordinated and gradually attuned to the perceived social patterns. From this point on, there is a continuous process of assimilation and accommodation between the self and social others. This interaction between self and others is often mediated by linguistic symbols. It can therefore take the form of dialogue (Hermans, Rijks, & Kempen, 1993). But more generally, this interaction is more behavioral, grounded in daily practices and routines carried out at both verbal and nonverbal levels, and often nondeliberate, and even automatic and unconscious, although it is still fully mediated by symbols.

An outcome of this symbolically mediated social interaction between self and other is the development of a system of action—or agency—that is shaped by and thus closely coordinated with the surrounding cultural environment. Each individual self is very much a collaborative output of the entire cultural community, which provides a matrix of generalized patterns of responses to the self.

The notion that cultural ideas are both reflected in and justified in terms of relevant social practices and institutions is quite old (see LeVine, Chapter 2, this volume for a historical review). Over a century ago, Max Weber (1904/1906/1958) pointed out that much of the contemporary capitalist social system and the individualistic ethos associated with it can be traced back to Protestant varieties of Christianity. Referring to this social system as an "iron cage" (p. 123), Weber emphasized the invisible yet highly objective nature of the cultural environment that is socially and historically constructed throughout the modern West. This cultural environment comprises a set of implicit rules that specify, for example, what it means and what it will actually take to succeed or even to survive. People's behaviors are governed by these rules, thereby transforming the rules into a "brutal" reality of life that in turn constrains and affords people's further behaviors. Characteristics of the behaviors that are afforded in this way by the Protestant Ethic and the resultant ethos of capitalism include, for example, hard work, personal goal orientation, and task focus. Because these mental features are literally required to survive in the capitalist environment, they are further fostered and reinforced by this environment.

Likewise, Giddens (1984), a British sociologist, proposed a structuration theory of society, wherein the social structure is an emerging property of the minds shaped by that social structure. This mutual influence between society and the mind is also a recurring theme of a theoretical writing of Bourdieu—a French sociologist (1977). More recently, the same idea has been elaborated by Shweder (1991), who reminded us that "psyche and culture... make each other up" (p. 73). Likewise a number of psychologists and anthropologists who follow the lead of Vygotsky and his Russian colleagues have argued for the fundamentally social nature of human thought and, by extension, individual agency in general (Cole & Hatano, Chapter 5, this volume), and have analyzed how this agency is constituted by myriad social practices, with a frequent emphasis on linguistic practices and use (e.g., Ochs, 1988).

This diverse array of proposals and analyses in various social science disciplines has converged to suggest that once socialized in a given cultural community, individuals will gradually develop a psychological system of regulating their own thoughts, feelings, and actions in attunement with myriad characteristics of the surrounding sociocultural environment. This psychological system of self-regulation constitutes the person's mode of being—his or her generalized pattern of thought, feeling, and action or standard operating procedures (Triandis, Chapter 3, this volume) employed
for these psychological functions (Kitayama & Duffy, 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 2004). The "mode of being," therefore, can be defined as a psychological system for action, or simply as agency. These terms are therefore used interchangeably hereafter. Each individual's mode of being is both constantly afforded and constrained by behaviors, expectations, or evaluations of others. More generally, it is maintained by generalized societal response tendencies or norms shared by others in the community. The emerging patterns of interdependence between one's mode of being and the generalized responses of the society at large provide the basis for anticipating substantial cross-cultural variations in the mode of being.

DEFINING CULTURE

To begin our analysis of the mode of being, it is necessary to have some tentative agreement about what culture is. Over the course of social science literature, culture has been variously defined (Kroeber & Kluckhorn, 1952/1966; see Borofsky, Barth, Shwedler, Rodseth, & Stolzenberg, 2001, for a recent debate on the issue). Yet common in many of the definitions is the notion that culture is a whole set of symbolic resources of a given community, such as lay theories, icons, scripts, and schemas (Adams & Markus, 2004). The symbolic resources of culture are accumulated and transmitted across generations and are usually externalized into social practices and social institutions (D'Andrade, 1995). For example, the cultural idea of God-given human rights is constitutive of many Western democratic social institutions. The same idea is also central in daily practices that emphasize choice (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). These symbolic resources of culture—both ideas and practices—inform members of the pertinent cultural community of what we referred to earlier as the more general societal response tendencies or norms shared by others in the community.

Culture is dynamic in that cultural ideas and practices are invented, accumulated, and systematically changed over time, both within and across generations (Moscovici, 1984). Culture is also dynamic because cultural ideas and practices have multiple meanings that are constantly in flux, negotiated, manipulated, and arbitrated for a variety of reasons by all individuals who participate in a cultural community. For example, practices and ideologies of people of power are often imitated by people of lower rank (Richerson & Boyd, 2005), enabling the former to initiate major cultural, political, and societal changes.

One particularly powerful type of symbolic resources of culture specifies the nature of self and its relationship with others. These ideas, called models of self and relationship (Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997), deserve special attention in psychology, because they are directly implicated in all psychological processes that constitute the self as agent and its relations with the surrounding social environment. As we have already noted, one cultural model of self and social relations that is especially influential in mainstream American middle-class culture can be traced back to the Protestant Ethic (Kitayama & Markus, 1999). This model distinguishes between the domains of work and social life. Originally, the distinction was grounded in the theological notion of calling—a mission assigned personally by God to the self. The notion of work as calling required the segregation of this domain from other domains, including social relations. Today, however, this segregation of work from social life is conventionalized as a social routine that represents a secular, mostly North American, middle-class work ethic of professionalism (Sanchez-Burks, 2005). This model and the associated moral imperatives then foster a variety of social behaviors that are highly individualistic, task-oriented, and relatively impervious to socioemotional cues in work settings, and that behaviors become highly consensual within a group of people who share the model.

One important consequence of the fact that cultural models are externalized in social practices is that relevant behaviors are regarded as normative and consensual (D'Andrade, 1995). Thus, they are often taken for granted. Rarely can any doubt be raised about the practices and their underlying assumptions. This applies not only to laypeople but also to the researchers who study them. Comparative methods are therefore imperative in cultural psychological research (Cohen, Chapter 8, this volume). For example, only when a comparison is drawn between middle-class American practices and those in other cultural groups do the historical roots and cultural groundings of the Protestant relational ideology become evident. Only through such comparison can the uniqueness of this cultural model be identified and delin-
CHAPTER OUTLINE

In this chapter, we elaborate on the thesis that cross-culturally divergent modes of being are contingent on cultural ideas and practices. Our emphasis is twofold. First, we hope to articulate two broad types of modes of being, independence and interdependence. Second, we also hope to delineate variable manifestations of these modes of being as a function of regions, social class, and other relevant sociocultural and historical factors and forces. The chapter consists of three parts.

First, we set up a theoretical framework. We argue that culturally sanctioned patterns of social relations encourage two divergent principles of action organization, which in turn foster correspondingly divergent modes of being; that is, independent social patterns encourage self-directedness, which in turn leads to (1) influence-oriented style of action, (2) self-centrality in self–other representations, and (3) analytic cognition. In contrast, interdependent social patterns encourage social responsiveness, which in turn leads to (1) adjustment-oriented style of action, (2) other-centrality in self–other representation, and (3) holistic cognition.

Second, we review evidence for psychological tendencies associated with the respective modes of being. Our review is organized around three components of the mode of being (i.e., style of agency, self–other representations, and cognition). We show that the three components tend to cohere together when one examines cultures that are historically highly independent (e.g., North American middle-class cultures) or highly interdependent (mainstream East Asian cultures).

In the third part of this chapter we examine developmental and social antecedents of the two modes of being. We first review evidence for systematic cultural shaping of the model of being through socialization, then examine cultures that are neither strongly independent nor strongly interdependent. We argue that the three components of the mode of being are distinct and thus dissociable. The analysis here is necessarily preliminary, because pertinent data are lacking. Yet we suggest that future effort along this line will allow us to take a focused look at antecedent conditions for the mode of being.

Altogether, we seek to advance a thesis that, through socialization, culture’s symbolic resources are incorporated or appropriated to form a system of behavioral regulation. This system—called the “cultural mode of being”—is thus symbolically mediated, both behavioral and mental, and, moreover, it is an integral part of a larger collective process by which culture is created, preserved, and changed. Thus, a dynamic process of mutual constitution emerges between culture and self. After examining some critical appraisals of the current approach to culture and self, we conclude with some suggestions for future work on the cultural mode of being.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: SOCIAL RELATIONS AND ACTION REGULATION

Our theoretical framework is presented in Figure 6.1. We assume that cultures vary substantially in what patterns of social relations are valued, encouraged, and appropriated to construct daily social interactions at many different levels and spheres. Because the culturally typical pattern of social relations requires disparate principles of behavioral regulation, it promotes correspondingly divergent ways in which social actions are organized, resulting in cross-culturally variable modes of being. It should be kept in mind that the causal sequence may go in the other direction. Thus, a given mode of being highlights the corresponding principle of action organization, which in turn may encourage the respective social relational patterns. In Figure 6.1, this possibility is acknowledged by dotted arrows (for earlier versions of the conceptualization, see, e.g., Kitayama & Markus, 1994, 1999; Markus et al., 1997).

Pattern of Social Relations

Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft

It goes without saying that there are many different social relations. However, these relations are likely to be classified into a relatively small number of types (Fiske, 1992). According to one prominent line of analysis, there are two
fundamentally different forms of sociality. These forms were referred to by Tönnies (1887/1998)—one of the first proponents of this view—as *gesellschaft* and *gemeinschaft*, respectively. *Gesellschaft* is a form of sociality maintained by instrumental goals of participating individuals, whereas *gemeinschaft* is derived from inherent connectedness of participating individuals. A society created by the consent of like-minded individuals is a typical example of *gesellschaft*, and family and other small-size communities are typical of *gemeinschaft*.

Whereas Tönnies suggested that the two forms of sociality define the most fundamental types, Fiske (1992) has argued for four basic models of social relations. Fiske’s first type is called “communal sharing,” is analogous to *gemeinschaft*. Equality matching encompasses reciprocal exchanges, which can take place in both *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*. Authority ranking implies hierarchical relations, which can also take place in both *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*. Finally, his market pricing focuses on instrumental social relations and thus resembles *gesellschaft*. It would appear, then, that Fiske’s framework adds elements of exchange and hierarchy to the scheme suggested by Tönnies.

Yet another important theoretical scheme by Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (1997) has proposed that three important classes of moral codes are used to organize social life. The morality of autonomy rests on the idea that each individual has an inherent value and comes with a set of “God-given” rights. It depicts the person as independent and both fully responsible for his or her own action and valuable in his or her own right. According to this morality, social relations are seen as derivative and thus largely instrumental. They are thus analogous to *gesellschaft* (or Fiske’s market pricing). The morality of community is derived from the idea that community is primary, and duties and obligations vis-à-vis the community are the ultimate arbiter of values and judgments. Therefore, this morality entails social relations that are given or that preexist prior to the emergence or definition of each individual participant, similar to Tönnies’ *gemeinschaft* (or Fiske’s communal sharing).

What is unique in the Shweder et al. (1997) scheme is inclusion of the third class of morality called “divinity,” which emphasizes sacred values associated with supernatural being(s) found in many religions of the world (Atran, Chapter 17, this volume). This third class of morality is distinct from both autonomy and community; moreover, it is associated with a distinct set of emotions (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Yet in terms of social relations, it is not clear whether this moral system is instrumental in forging any unique class of worldly social relationships.

In short, it is a reasonable first approximation to suggest that *gesellschaft* and *gemeinschaft* are two of the most basic types of social relations. In fact, analogous typologies have
been repeatedly proposed. Thus, models of social relations analogous to gesellschaft have been called independent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), autonomous (Sampson, 1988), self-oriented (Parsons & Shils, 1951), egocentric (Shweder & Bourne, 1982), exchange (Clark & Mills, 1979), and individualist (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1989). Given this class of models, social relations are formed on the basis of instrumental goals of participating individuals. The other class of models is based on a contrasting assumption that the self is fundamentally connected with and is in fact embedded and made meaningful within social relationships. These models are referred to as interdependent, connected, socially oriented, sociocentric, communal, and collectivist.

It is important to emphasize that both independent, instrumental, and goal-directed practices, values, and ideas and interdependent, communal, and group-oriented ones are available in all cultures (Fiske, 1992). Moreover, in all cultures, some types of relations (e.g., business transactions) are mostly construed to be goal-oriented and guided by self-interests, whereas some other types of relations (e.g., friendship relations) are mostly construed as communal and centered (Fiske, 1992; Kitayama & Uchida, 2004). However, these two models of social relations are unevenly distributed, and differentially sanctioned and valued across cultures. Thus, the overarching hypothesis is that there is a substantial cross-cultural variation in the relative significance and prevalence of the two forms of social relations.

Cross-Cultural Variation in Predominant Forms of Social Relations: Evidence from Cross-Cultural Value Surveys

Whereas the foregoing classifications are largely theoretical, during the last three decades there have been numerous attempts to measure cultural values. This literature has discussed the distinction between gesellschaft and gemeinschaft under the rubric of individualism and collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1989), and has provided an important clue to the question of whether cultural groups might vary systematically in terms of their relative emphasis on the two values related to both self and social relations (for reviews, see Kagitcibi, 1997; Smith & Schwartz, 1997).

In 1980 Hofstede published Culture's Consequences. In this influential monograph, Hofstede reports results from a survey conducted on 117,000 IBM employees in 40 nations. In one part of the survey, participants were asked to report how important each of 14 work-related values was to them. The researcher first controlled for acquiescence response bias (a tendency to provide affirmative answers regardless of question contents; Smith, 2004). By factor-analyzing the mean country scores for the 14 values, Hofstede identified two factors, the first of which is of interest here. This factor had high positive loadings on the tendencies to value (1) personal time outside of work, (2) freedom to choose different approaches in job, and (3) challenges in work. It also had high negative loadings on the tendencies to value (1) training opportunities in work, (2) good physical conditions in work, and (3) full use of one’s work skills (Hofstede, 1980, p. 220). One obvious problem with this work is that some of the items have no obvious connections to either individualism or collectivism. Hofstede (1991) argues, however, that within the work environment in which the survey was conducted, the discovered dimension can be seen as representing individualism (i.e., a value placed on both personal freedom vis-a-vis work obligation and personal initiatives at work) on the one hand, and collectivism (i.e., a value placed on the work environment and, thus, on IBM—the company) on the other.

The Hofstede measure is not without problems. First, as already mentioned, not all items would seem obviously related to the constructs unless considered and interpreted in the specific context in which the survey was conducted—IBM workers responding on their work values within the context of their own work environment. Second, country-level indicators of values are enormously noisy; hence, they are unlikely to be completely valid. Third, reported values and attitudes are, after all, what people think and say. But culture’s practices, symbols, and institutions are much more than each person’s thought contents (Kitayama, 2002). Fourth, some important artifacts can potentially distort survey results. These artifacts include reference group effect (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002), acquiescence bias (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005), and absence of any one-to-one relationship between social values or norms and personal values (Peng, Nisbett, & Wong,
1997). Hence, there is good reason to be cautious in interpreting the results from cross-cultural value and attitude surveys.

Nevertheless, the Hofstede measure has proved to be valid, often highly correlated with certain cultural or societal characteristics. For example, it is related to other country-level measures of values (Bond, 1988; Ingelhart & Baker, 2000; Triandis et al., 1986; Schwartz, 1992). Moreover, it is positively correlated with the Gross National Product (GNP; Smith & Schwartz, 1997), democratization (Ingelhart & Baker, 2000), national means of subjective well-being (Diener & Diener, 1995), and even certain linguistic features such as pronoun drop (Kashima & Kashima, 2003; see Diener & Suh, 2000, for a review). It is also important that these country scores correspond closely to expert judgments (Peng et al., 1997). We regard this empirical convergence as impressive, which provides a basis to assume that the Hofstede score of individualism (vs. collectivism) is basically valid as a country-level indicator of individualism and collectivism.

For the present purposes, then, this dimension may be seen as an index of predominant forms of social relations sanctioned in varying cultural contexts. Thus, both Western European countries and the United States are high in individualism (thus, *gesellschaft* for instrumental relations are encouraged and culturally sanctioned) and many Asian and South American countries are high in collectivism (thus, *gemeinschaft* for communal relations are encouraged and culturally sanctioned).

In summary, the classic dimension of *gemeinschaft* (collectivism and interdependence) and *gesellschaft* (individualism and independence) has been identified, albeit often implicitly, by numerous researchers in the past as crucial in understanding cultural values (Hofstede, 1980; Ingelhart & Baker, 2000; Schwartz, 1992), social behavior (Triandis, 1995), social institutions (Parsons & Shils, 1951), and self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Moreover, despite some recent claims to the contrary (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Matsumoto, 1999; Takano & Osaka, 1999), the cultural variation along this dimension appears both systematic and substantial, often correlated strongly with some distinct cultural characteristics, including GNP, linguistic features, and overall levels of subjective well-being (Hofstede, 1980; Schimmack et al., 2003).

Among others, these data provide evidence that Western Europeans and North Americans are considerably more oriented toward independence and individualism, whereas Asians are considerably more oriented toward interdependence and collectivism.

**Principle of Action Regulation**

The two forms of social relations discussed earlier authenticate very different principles of action regulation. To participate in instrumental social relations, individuals have to know their goals, desires, needs, and plans, appraise the attendant social situation with respect to these internal attributes of the self, then direct themselves in accordance with the relevant attributes of the self. The central principle of action organization, then, is goal directedness. In contrast, to participate in communal social relations, individuals have to be vigilant with respect to external contingencies, including expectations, desires, and needs of others, as well as a variety of other nonpersonal elements in the attendant social situation, then actively act to adjust their own behaviors to such contingencies. The central principle, then, is responsiveness to social contingencies.

At first glance, self-directedness might seem to give rise to war-like interpersonal states where egocentric Machiavellian strategists try to deceive one another to promote their own interests without mercy for others, whereas social responsiveness might appear to encourage benign welfare-oriented social utopias. This initial impression is both naive and deceptive. In fact, within an instrumental social relationship, individuals have to be chosen by others to benefit from social relations. Social rejection is just as damaging in instrumental relations as in communal relations (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Moreover, social rejection may present a realistic threat, especially in instrumental relations, because, unlike communal relations, instrumental relations are relatively easy to terminate. Thus, one important class of goals in instrumental social interactions is to be liked and respected by others. In contrast, within a communal social relationship, individuals can be confident that others in the relationship are attentive to their actions, and even their thoughts and feelings. Yet this attentiveness need not be benign. In many interdependent, collectivist societies, therefore, the worst enemy is often imagined to be among one's best
friends (Adams & Plaut, 2003). Thus, in many instances, general trust that people experience and report in respect to social others or the society in general is bound to be higher in independent, individualist societies than in interdependent, collectivist societies (Fukuyama, 1992; Ingelhart & Baker, 2000; Putnam, 1993; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1985).

Mode of Being

We propose that the cross-culturally divergent principles of action organization (self-directedness and social responsiveness) give rise to differences in three components of self-regulation. In organizing and regulating one’s own actions, one has to represent the surrounding environment in which action takes place (cognition). Within this environment, one then has to represent both the self and other relevant people (self–other representation). On the basis of both the general situational construal and the representation of both the self and others, one then regulates his or her own behaviors (style of action). These three elements of self-regulation are coordinated with one another. Yet they are distinct and partially independent. This idea is illustrated in Figure 6.2, where the components are denoted by overlapping circles. Within the respective mode of being, the most typical case can be found at the center, where the three circles overlap. Yet there are many other cases in which one or even two of the elements are missing. We argue later that this analysis allows us to cover a wide range of cultures that are neither strongly independent nor interdependent.

Independent Mode

When culture emphasizes independent, goal-oriented, instrumental practices and ideas in organizing social relations (i.e., gesellschaft), one’s predominant form of action tends to be the use of his or her own goals, desires, judgments, and other internal attributes in an effort to cause changes in the environment. This form of action has been sometimes called “primary control” (Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984). Typical examples include behaviors oriented toward personal achievement and attempts at persuading others. Morling, Kitayama, and Miyamoto (2002) have called this mode of action “influence” to emphasize that it involves an effort to cause changes in the environment. Of course, within the influence mode of action, social others are important. But they are considered important only to the extent that they are seen as instrumental in achieving one’s own goals and desires. Accordingly, the representations of the self tend to be more emphasized, elaborated, and/or valued than the representations of others. This mode of self–other representation may be said to be self- or egocentric (Shweder & Bourne, 1982) or self-oriented (Parsons & Shils, 1951). Moreover, goal-directedness is likely to foster focused attention toward a goal-relevant object in the environment. This may be the case even when the object at issue is another individual. When a single object is picked up and detached from the immediate context, it is likely to be scrutinized “for its own sake,” categorized in terms of a general taxonomic system. In person perception, for example, a focal person is likely to be categorized in terms of personality taxon-

![Figure 6.2](image-url)

**Figure 6.2.** Varieties of independence (A) and interdependence (B): The respective modes of being comprise three primary features—agency, self–other representation, and cognition. The three features tend to go together, but there may be many exceptions.
omy. Likewise, in object perception, a focal stimulus is likely to be understood in terms of a relevant semantic category. This mode of thought is called "analytic" (Nisbett et al., 2001). In short, the independent mode of being is associated with (1) action as influence, (2) self-centricity in self- other representations, and (3) analytic mode of thought.

There is a general consensus in the literature that the view of the self as independent and the corresponding form of social relation (gesellschaft) have their origins in the modern period in Western Europe, although many of the ideas of the modern West can be traced back to the Greek civilization (Nisbett, 2003). Reformation of the Catholic Church and the resulting Calvinist varieties of Protestantism had a major influence on the emergence of the independent view of person (Sanchez-Burks, 2005). So did numerous philosophers of the Enlightenment, including Rousseau, Locke, and Voltaire (Taylor, 1989). Once transplanted in North America through initial waves of Western European immigrants and espoused by the Founding Fathers of the United States, the independent view of the self has since become a cornerstone of mainstream American culture (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985). As Geertz (1973) noted, North Americans are wedded to the view of the person as "a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background" (p. 43). Today this view of the person is embodied in numerous cultural artifacts, mundane practices of daily life, social institutions, and personal values.

Nevertheless, there is likely to be substantial variation within North America in the degree to which people subscribe to the independent view of the self. One can expect considerable ethnic variations, such that the independent mode of being may be most clearly identified among Americans of Western European descent. Moreover, to the extent that self- direction is related to job complexity (Schooler, Chapter 15, this volume), the independent mode of being may be less pronounced for working-class people, whose jobs are bound to be more routinized, not requiring flexible thought, and are thus less complex. Moreover, the same consideration might suggest that the independent mode of being may be identified in many other regions of the world. For example, middle-class individuals in industrialized societies may show some sign of independence in part because their jobs require a greater extent of self-directedness, flexible thinking, and autonomy.

**Interdependent Mode**

When culture emphasizes interdependent, other-oriented communal practices and ideas in organizing social relations (i.e., gemeinschaft), one's predominant form of action tends to be the consideration of expectations, desires, and needs of others in an effort to adjust one's own actions to these intentional states attributed to the others. This form of action, most typically characterized in terms of its responsiveness to concerns and expectations of others, and more generally to a variety of social contingencies, has sometimes been called "secondary control" (Weisz et al., 1984). Typical examples include behaviors oriented toward concerns of others and attempts at conforming to and gratifying others. Morling and colleagues (2002) have called this mode of action "adjustment" to emphasize the fact that this mode involves an effort to accommodate one's own behaviors in accordance with contingencies that present themselves in social relations.

Within the adjustment mode of action, others are centrally important. In fact, selves are often defined and made meaningful in respect to such others. For example, most social roles, such as child, parent, teacher, and student, can be defined only in reference to pertinent social others. Likewise, even seemingly purely private attributes, such as opinions and judgments, may also be defined in such relational terms. For example, one might agree or disagree with others. Or one might identify him- or herself with someone else in a particular domain. Interdependence does not necessarily imply obedience and conformity. In fact, many forms of rebellion also presume a tightly knit relationship with powerful others. In all these cases, because the self is defined in reference to social others, the cognitive representations of these others are likely to be at least as elaborated, highlighted, and often valued as the cognitive representations of the self. In this sense, this mode may be said to be sociocentric (Shweder & Bourne, 1982) or socially oriented (Parsons & Shils, 1951). Moreover, responsiveness to social contingencies is likely to foster holistic attention—that is, attention that is dispersed to
many potentially significant elements of the environment. This may be the case even when the elements at issue are other individuals. When individuals attend to many such elements simultaneously, they are likely to be understood within a holistic scheme. Instead of characterizing each of many individuals involved in terms of their unique personality traits, one may come up with a broader schema of the relationship or the group as a whole that encompasses all the individuals involved. This mode of thought is called "holistic" (Nisbett et al., 2001). In short, the interdependent mode of being is associated with (1) action as adjustment, (2) sociocentricity in self–other representations, and (3) holistic mode of thought.

It is generally agreed that in many societies outside the West, the self is inherently more social, connected with others and immediate communities. In fact, throughout much of the history of human existence, social relations have predominantly been kin-based and relatively stable (Brewer, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Konner, Chapter 4, this volume); moreover, they are limited to relatively small groups of up to 80 at most (Dunbar, 1996). These considerations suggest that the interdependent mode of being, which is defined primarily in terms of its connectedness with others and its immersion in a community, may have been common for much of its history for the human species (Konner, Chapter 4, this volume). If true, this substantially reduces the burden of explaining the origins of cultural differences, with a main emphasis to be placed on the emergence of the independent mode out of the interdependent mode. Some possible hypotheses include modernization (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), voluntary settlement (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006), and wealth (Triandis, 1995).

Nevertheless, even if the interdependent mode is primordial, defining some sort of default form of sociality for humans, this by no means implies that cultures outside of the modern West are entirely homogeneous. To the contrary, it is likely that different types of interdependence existed throughout history and over different geographic regions (Fiske et al., 1998). For example, a deep commitment to immediate family of Chinese is clearly different than the Moroccan way of defining the self in terms of birthplaces (Geertz, 1973). Likewise, whereas a founding ideology for Chinese society, Confucianism, emphasizes virtues of adhering to hierarchical social relations, there is a much stronger egalitarian, communal emphasis in hunter-gatherer groups in Africa (Fiske, 1992) and Australia (Myers, 1986). Moreover, collectivism of Confucian cultures regards personal positive affect as a hindrance of social harmony, but collectivism of Latin cultures appears to be used as a glue of social relations (Cohen, Chapter 8, this volume). Nevertheless, in all these cases, the primary commitment is to a social unit of which the self is part. The self is ascribed to the unit and often is deeply connected and attached to it. The self’s belongingness to the group is taken largely as given, not as chosen for his or her own instrumental goals or considerations. Accordingly, along with massive differences, a set of common themes or features may cut across many of the interdependent societies and communities.

**EAST–WEST DIFFERENCES IN MODE OF BEING**

Much of the evidence for the two modes of being comes from systematic cross-cultural comparisons between North American middle-class populations and East Asian populations. This evidence suggests that whereas East Asians show a predominantly interdependent mode of being, middle-class North Americans exhibit a predominantly independent mode of being. These two cultures can be characterized by the completely overlapping area of Figure 6.2. In what follows, we review evidence for each of the three components of the mode of being. Our review is more thorough and comprehensive for the style of action component than for either the self–other representation or the cognition, because the latter two domains are covered in full in other chapters by Heine (Chapter 29, this volume) and Norenzayan et al. (Chapter 23, this volume), respectively.

**Style of Action**

The first component of the mode of being involves a style of action as either influence or adjustment. Whereas self-directedness fosters influence, social responsiveness promotes adjustment.

**Prevalence and Consequences of Influence and Adjustment**

In an influential article, Weiss and colleagues (1984) reviewed a variety of cultural practices and customs of both American and Japanese
cultures. In North America, many more practices highlight the self (thereby allowing one to stand out and act in accordance with one’s own judgments), and the corresponding values and beliefs in self-directedness and active effort to cause changes to happen in the environment (called “primary control”). In contrast, in Japan many more practices encourage the self to conform to expectations or needs of others (thereby adjusting oneself to these expectations or needs), and the corresponding values and beliefs in social sensitivity and attunement (called “secondary control”). Secondary control is a misnomer, because this mode of action is just as agentic as the mode called primary control; moreover, it is no less primary in Japan. Morling, Kitayama, and Miyamoto (2002) therefore call the two styles of action “influence” and “adjustment,” respectively.

To see whether this cultural difference is prevalent in practices involving influence and adjustment, Morling and colleagues (2002) asked both North Americans and Japanese to remember the most recent instance in which they either “influenced the surrounding” or “adjusted themselves to the surrounding.” They then asked the participants to indicate how recently the remembered event took place. If a given class of events is frequent, they should occur in the more recent past. As predicted, the latest influencing episode was less than a day old in the United States, but it was several days old in Japan. This cross-cultural difference was completely reversed for the adjusting episodes.

What are the consequences of acts of influence or adjustment relative to self-perception? Two dimensions of self-perception are especially relevant. First, efficacy, esteem, or power of the self (or self-esteem) is a central defining feature of the sense of the self as independent (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Because the act of influencing is an expression of self-esteem, it may be predicted that individuals would feel empowered and thus report enhanced self-esteem when they engage in an act of influence. This effect, however, may depend on culture. Because influencing behaviors are culturally sanctioned in North America to a far greater extent than in Japan, the effect of an influencing act on self-esteem may be predicted to be more pronounced in North America than in Japan. The second relevant dimension of self-perception concerns the sense of connectedness to others. Because an act of adjusting is an expression of one’s commitment to a relationship and the value one attaches to it, it may be predicted that individuals feel more connected when they engage in an act of adjustment. Moreover, because adjusting behaviors are more culturally sanctioned in Japan than in North America, this effect of adjustment on perceived connectedness of self may be predicted to be greater in Japan than in the United States.

These predictions received support in another study by Morling and colleagues (2002), who first collected many episodes of both influencing and adjusting from both American and Japanese participants. New groups of both American and Japanese participants were then presented with a randomly selected subset of the episodes thus collected. They were asked to imagine that they engaged in each act described in each episode, and to report how they would feel on dimensions of (1) self-esteem (self-efficacy, esteem, and power) and (2) perceived connectedness with others. The results lend support to the preceding analysis. When engaging in American-made influencing acts, Americans felt quite empowered, reporting enhanced self-esteem. Although a comparable empowering effect of influence was found in Japan, the effect was much weaker. In contrast, when engaging in Japanese-made adjusting acts, Japanese participants reported a strongly enhanced sense of interpersonal connectedness. Furthermore, in line with the foregoing analysis, a comparable connection-enhancing effect of adjustment was virtually nonexistent in the United States.

Interestingly, Americans reported an enhanced sense of connectedness when they engaged in American-made influencing acts. This latter finding suggests that acts of influencing in North America provide a culturally sanctioned way to interpersonally relate to others. Americans often relate to others by arguing or debating, persuading, and proactively helping others. Persuasion defines a major genre of interpersonal relations in all spheres of American life. Even conflicts and interpersonal tensions are often believed to be generative (Rothbaum, Pott, Azuma, Miyake, & Weisz, 2000). These acts are obviously interpersonal, yet they involve a form of influence. Influence thus provides a way in which separated selves are related to one another without compromising the ever-important sense of the self as independent and separate. There was no evidence that influence has such a connecting function in Japan.

The thesis that Americans use social influences to connect to others has received addi-
tional support from recent research by Taylor and colleagues (2004), who show that Americans are much more likely than Asians and Asian Americans to seek support. The explicit solicitation of support is a form of influence; thus, it fits neatly into the default mode of social relations for Americans. Notice that as long as support is explicitly sought, any helpful acts Americans might receive as a consequence are unlikely to compromise their sense of self as independent and self-sufficient. Instead, they are likely to signify the self’s interpersonal efficacy, as shown by Morling et al. (2002) in the previously cited work. In contrast, Taylor and colleagues (2004) suggest that Asians do not explicitly seek support from others because of relational concerns, such as causing trouble to the others.

All research available to date on influence is concerned with relations involving peers and friends. It might seem plausible that Asians also seek to influence others as long as these others are lower in social status and rank. Alternatively, even in hierarchical relationships, Asians might seek to avoid explicit forms of influence in part because those in lower in status or rank (e.g., subordinates, children, etc.) might willingly adjust to the expectations of those higher in status and rank. At present, no empirical work exists on this question.

Self-Images and Dissonance

Influence and adjustment as alternative principles of agency may result in quite different concerns about the self. Whereas individuals operating on the principle of independence and influence are concerned with efficacy, competence, moral integrity, and other internal qualities of the self, those operating on the principle of interdependence and adjustment are concerned with what social others might think about the self’s qualities. Recently, this analysis has been applied to cognitive dissonance.

Drawing on theories of dissonance process that emphasize the role of self (Aronson, 1968; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993), Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, and Suzuki (2004) suggested that dissonance can take cross-culturally divergent forms, because cultures emphasize different aspects of self. In independent cultural contexts, such as North American cultures, private self-images, such as the self’s competence and moral integrity, are highlighted; as a consequence, individuals are hypothesized to experience dissonance when their behavioral choice poses a threat to a certain private self-image they wish to sustain. For example, a choice between two equally attractive cars can raise a threat to one’s competence as a wise decision maker and consumer, because the chosen car might have negative features and/or the rejected car might have positive features. Kitayama and colleagues have called this “personal dissonance.” In contrast, in interdependent cultural contexts, such as many Asian cultures, public self-images, such as the self’s reputations and social acceptance, are highlighted; as a consequence, individuals experience dissonance when their behavioral choice poses a threat to a certain public self-image they hope to maintain. For example, having chosen to buy a luxurious German car might raise a concern about what one’s colleagues and neighbors might think about the self. This has been called interpersonal dissonance.

Whether personal or interpersonal, dissonance is an aversive emotional state that motivates the person to justify the original choice (Festinger, 1957). Thus, once induced to experience dissonance, individuals are motivated to justify the act of positively choosing one item by increasing their liking for it and/or justifying the act of giving up another item by decreasing their liking for it. Nevertheless, the foregoing theoretical framework suggests that, depending on the cultural contexts of the person at issue, the dissonance is likely to be aroused under quite different circumstances.

One critical variable is an awareness of “eyes of others” watching and closely monitoring the self (Imada & Kitayama, 2006; Kitayama et al., 2004). Because personal dissonance hinges on what one’s choice would mean to one’s private self-image, it should happen in total privacy, in the absence of the eyes of others. In contrast, interpersonal dissonance hinges on what one’s choice might mean to one’s public self-image. For this dissonance to arise, the choice would have to be perceived as public. In fact, if the choice is believed to be completely private, it entails no ramifications for one’s public self-image. Under these conditions, there should be little or no dissonance effect.

To test these ideas, Kitayama and colleagues (2004; Imada & Kitayama, 2006) had both American (mostly white, middle class) and Japanese participants (living in Kyoto) choose between two equally attractive CDs and examined the degree to which liking for the chosen CD increased and that for the rejected CD decreased. A key manipulation involved a poster.
that, seemingly prepared for a conference presentation, contained several schematic faces that were "watching" whoever was seated right in front of it. In an eyes-of-others condition, this poster was surreptitiously placed so that participants were exposed to a stimulus configuration that mimicked people looking at them. Although no one raised any suspicions about the poster, Kitayama and colleagues (2004) drew on previous work on automatic information processing (e.g., Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990), and predicted that this stimulus configuration would covertly, yet powerfully, evoke public self-image concerns among Japanese. In a control condition, no poster was placed before participants.

In support of the foregoing analysis, Japanese participants did not show any dissonance effect in the control condition, but they did show a reliable dissonance effect in the "eyes-of-others" condition. This suggests that in making a choice, the Japanese worry mostly about what the choice might mean to their public self-image. A dissonance effect for them can therefore happen only when these public self-image concerns are engaged. In contrast, Americans showed a strong dissonance effect in the control condition. But this effect was reduced in the eyes-of-others condition. Imada and Kitayama (2006) replicated this effect and proposed that Americans assume that others try to influence them and, as a consequence, watching eyes of others are perceived to constrain their choice. Alternatively, the eyes might have provoke a degree of reactance. In either case, choice under these conditions is perceived as externally constrained and less free, entailing a lesser threat to one's private self-images and a lesser need for self-justification. In support of this proposal, Imada and Kitayama have shown that a strong dissonance effect remains even when faces are presented, as long as the faces look weak and submissive (thus, unlikely to exert any unwanted influences). This pattern of findings suggests that in making a choice, Americans worry mostly about what the choice might mean to their private self-image. Only to the extent that this anxiety affects one's private self does a dissonance effect accrue for Americans.

Another recent series of studies has provided further evidence for the present analysis. Hoshino-Browne and colleagues (2005) proposed that a strong interpersonal dissonance (an interpersonal worry resulting from a threat to one's public image) can result from a choice one makes for one's friend. But this effect should be observed only for those who hold quite strong public self-image concerns (e.g., Asians), not for those who do not worry much about public self-images (e.g., European Canadians). As predicted, a justification effect subsequent to a choice made for a friend was significantly larger for Asian Canadians and Japanese than for Caucasian Canadians.

Researchers have argued that dissonance represents a threat to the personal self; thus, an affirmation of the personal self should readily eliminate self-justification (Steele, 1988). This prediction has been borne out in many studies. Yet, if the dissonance experienced by Asian Canadians is interpersonal rather than personal in nature, the affirmation must be directed at the interpersonal (rather than the personal) self for it to be effective in eliminating the dissonance. In a typical self-affirmation manipulation, participants are asked to circle all values that they personally shared. In addition to this personal affirmation manipulation, Hoshino-Browne and colleagues (2005) used an interpersonal affirmation manipulation in which participants were to circle values their families shared. As predicted, the dissonance effect of Asian Canadians in the friend choice condition was significantly weaker in the interpersonal affirmation condition than in a no-affirmation control. The finding from the personal affirmation condition was quite noteworthy. It turned out that this affirmation manipulation was quite effective if the Asian Canadians were fully acculturated in Canada and identified themselves with the Canadian mainstream culture. No such effect was evident among nonacculturated Asian Canadians.

**Intrinsic Motivation**

The personal dissonance process just discussed suggests that choice is an integral part of behavioral motivations for Americans. In agreement with this analysis, self-determination theory has suggested that through choice and autonomous engagement in an activity, one's intrinsic motivation is enhanced (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lepper & Greene, 1978). For interdependent agents, however, it may be choice made by ingroup members that engages the intrinsic motivation of the person at issue. Such a choice conveys to the person high expectations and hopes held by the others with regard to the
performance of this person. Consistent with this analysis, several observers of Asian cultures have noted that achievement in Asia is often motivated by feelings of indebtedness to parents. Thus, a desire to return obligations to them and to erase any sense of guilt or shame is a major source of personal strivings for excellence (DeVos, 1983; Yang, 1986).

In support of this analysis, Iyengar and Lepper (1999) had European and Asian American children work on a video game involving spaceships. One group of children were allowed to choose the color of their own spaceship. A second group of children were assigned one color by the experimenter; finally, a third group of children were told that their mother chose the color of the spaceship for them. As may be predicted by both our analysis of independent agency and self-determination theory, white children performed much better when they made the choice by themselves than when the color was assigned by the experimenter. Their performance was worst when their mothers made the choice for them. In contrast, as predicted by our analysis on interdependent agency, Asian American children performed better when their mothers made the choice than when either they made their own choice or the experimenter assigned the color.

The motivation to improve the self to meet high expectations held by significant others has been called “self-improvement” (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997), which involves identification of one’s own shortcomings and deficits via-à-via collectively shared high expectations and standards, and an assessment of one’s own performance in comparison to such high expectations or standards. It is the experience of deficit or shortcoming that strongly motivates the person to improve. In a recent series of experiments, Heine and colleagues (2001) observed that in an intellectual competence task, Japanese participants were most motivated to persist in the task when they were led to believe they had failed rather than succeeded in a similar task. This pattern was in stark contrast with the pattern observed for Americans, who persisted much more after success than after failure.

Lay Theories of Agency

Do individuals have naive beliefs about actions that are in line with their respective modes of being as independent or interdependent? Our analysis suggests that North Americans would see another person’s act as a form of influence and, as a consequence, would look for internal events that motivated the person to engage in the act. A voluminous social psychology literature on causal attribution has provided ample evidence for the American tendency to focus on internal cause of action, while ignoring potentially available external causes. This effect is so pervasive that it has been called the “fundamental attribution error” (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Ross, 1977). In contrast, Asians would see another person’s act as a form of adjustment and, as a consequence, would immediately look for external events that prompted the person to engage in that act. Hence, the fundamental attribution error may be attenuated or even nonexistent in cultures organized around an alternative view of the self as interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, 2003).

Since a pioneering study by Miller (1984), this cross-cultural prediction has received substantial support (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Norenzayan, Choi, & Peng, Chapter 23, this volume). Morris and Peng (1994), for example, presented to both American and Chinese respondents various pictures of a number of fish swimming in different formations. When asked for reasons explaining the movement of a central fish, Americans were more likely to refer to internal factors of the fish (e.g., its psychological dispositions) than to factors external to it (e.g., movements of other fish that are present) as a causal factor underlying the fish’s movement. In contrast, Chinese respondents were more likely to refer to external factors than to internal factors in the same task. The same cross-cultural difference has been observed in content analyses of media materials (Morris & Peng, 1994) and commentaries on professional sports events (Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog, 1996).

The dispositional bias in attribution implies that individuals are relatively impervious to external or situational factors. Thus, when observing another person behaving under a social constraint, individuals may be expected to ignore the social constraint and instead infer directly from the person’s behavior a disposition that corresponds to the behavior (Jones, 1988). This bias, called the “correspondence bias,” has been demonstrated among Americans even when the social constraint is quite salient, or
when the action is seemingly nondiagnostic at all of the disposition at hand (Gilbert & Jones, 1986). Under these conditions, however, Asians show very little evidence for correspondence bias (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Masuda & Kitayama, 2004; Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002).

For example, Masuda and Kitayama (2004) tested participants in pairs. One participant was assigned an inducer role and the other, an observer role. The task of the inducer participant was to choose one of two essays and give it to a third participant, who in turn read the essay. Both the inducer and the observer were to observe the third participant read the essay and report an impression of him or her. The inducer participant was then given two alternative essays that argued for one or another position on a socially controversial issue at the time (e.g., the nuclear testing France carried out in the Mururoa Coral Reef), and asked to choose one and to give it to the third participant. Both the inducer and the observer subsequently saw a video of the third participant reading the essay and estimated the real attitude of this person on the social issue at hand. Notice that under these conditions, it is very clear that the third participant did not actively choose the essay; nor did he or she write it. Moreover, the social pressure the inducer exerted on the target person is also very clear. Conceptually replicating an earlier study by Gilbert and Jones (1986), Masuda and Kitayama (2004) found that Americans still inferred that the target person's attitude corresponded to the essay content. This very strongly illustrates how robust this dispositional bias in fact is among Americans. As predicted, however, Japanese respondents showed no correspondence bias. Clearly, they acknowledged the nature of social constraints imposed on the target person and made adjustments for them in estimating his or her real attitude.

Lay Theories of Happiness

If the mode of being is different along with common lay theories of agency that go with it, people may appraise their lives in the correspondingly divergent fashion. Accordingly, although happiness as a general positive emotional state is widely acknowledged in all known cultures (Mesquita & Fridja, 1992), underneath this general proposition might be profound cross-cultural differences in lay understandings about happiness. Kitayama and Markus (2000) have suggested that in North America, happiness is typically construed as a personal achievement. Thus, individuals strive to attain happiness and, once obtained, happiness affirms the worth of the internal, private self. In contrast, according to Kitayama and Markus, happiness in Japan is more socially anchored. It is seen as a realization of social harmony or state of mutual sympathy and understanding.

Evidence for this proposal comes from a recent study by Uchida and Kitayama (2006), who asked both American and Japanese participants to describe as many "features, effects, or consequences of happiness" as they could. A large number of features collected in the respective cultures were printed on separate index cards. A stack of cards was then presented to another group of participants within each culture. These participants were asked to sort the cards according to perceived similarities of the descriptions. On the basis of these data, Uchida and Kitayama computed the likelihood of each pair of descriptions to be classified into the same pile. This likelihood (an index of perceived similarities among the features of happiness, varying between 0 and 1) was used to compute a multidimensional scaling solution. In both cultures, three types of descriptions were commonly found: general hedonic states (e.g., joy, excitement, and positive attitude), personal achievement (e.g., getting a good grade, getting a job) and interpersonal harmony (e.g., getting along with others, having a party for a friend).

In support of the Kitayama and Markus (2000) hypothesis, Uchida and Kitayama (2006) observed in the American sorting data that the descriptions related to personal achievement were much more likely to be classified into the general hedonic state pile than were those related to interpersonal harmony. This suggests that positive hedonic experience of happiness is most closely associated with personal achievement for Americans. In contrast, the Japanese associated the general hedonic state of happiness to a far greater extent with social harmony than with personal achievement. Thus, social harmony and interdependence are the crucial element of the Japanese understanding of happiness. Results of several studies that examine correlates of happiness and life satisfaction (e.g., Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000; Kwan, Bond, &
Singelis, 1997; Oishi & Diener, 2003) are consistent with this analysis (see Diener & Tov, Chapter 28, this volume; Uchida, Norasakkunkit, & Kitayama, 2004 for reviews; also see the section on health and well-being).

**Emotional Consequences of Style of Action**

Kitayama and colleagues (2000; Kitayama, Markus, & Matsuo, 1995; Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, in press) pointed out that some emotions are closely associated with either independence or interdependence. Emotions associated with an accomplishment of independence (including pride, self-confidence, and feelings of superiority) are called “socially disengaging positive emotions.” Emotions associated with a failure in independence and an attendant motivation to restore the tarnished independence (including anger, frustration, and sulky feelings) are called “socially disengaging negative emotions.” Likewise, socially engaging emotions include both positive emotions, which result from success in tasks of interdependence (e.g., friendly feelings, close feelings, and respect), and negative emotions, which result from a failure in tasks of interdependence and accompany a motivation to restore tainted interdependence (e.g., guilt, shame, and feelings of indebtedness).

In a recent series of studies, Kitayama and colleagues (in press) asked both American and Japanese participants to report how intensely they experienced a number of emotions in each of many different social situations. They found, as should be predicted, that emotions are intensely experienced only when they share the pleasantness with the attendant situations. But more importantly, among the emotions matched in pleasantness to the situations, the intensity of experience depended very much on each emotion’s social orientation (engaged vs. disengaged). As predicted by the notion that Americans and Japanese seek independence and interdependence, respectively, Americans reportedly experienced disengaged emotions more intensely than engaged emotions, but Japanese reportedly experienced engaged emotions more intensely than disengaged emotions. The cross-cultural difference was quite sizable, with Cohen’s $d$ ranging between 1.0 and 1.5.

Further evidence for the hypothesis that emotional experiences are organized in a way that promotes one of the two predominant modes of being comes from a recent study by Mesquita et al. (2005), who asked both Japanese and Americans (college students and adults from local communities) to provide detailed accounts of their experience of pride, humiliation, and anger. Through a systematic coding of these accounts, they found that the two cultural groups varied widely in many facets of the emotional experience. For example, when feeling pride, 80% of Americans willingly took responsibility for the positive event at issue, but only 37% of Japanese did so. Instead, a majority of Japanese (61%) in the midst of the pride episode remained self-critical by reminding themselves that there was room for further improvement—a tendency rarely observed among Americans. In anger experiences, whereas Americans tended to be strongly inclined to affirm and to justify themselves while feeling aggressive toward the offender, the Japanese were much more likely to report sympathy toward the offender. Although seemingly quite benign, this sympathy might often be close to contempt; that is, we suspect that the sympathy in a case like this might often be based on a perception of the offender as having no chance or hope for betterment, thus being unworthy of even minimal respect. This sympathy—which is close in nuance to “pity” without an overtly pejorative attitude toward the offender—might therefore be a socially desirable way of expressing the contempt. Finally, when humiliated, Americans were reportedly motivated to reaffirm the self and even to become aggressive; Japanese reportedly took responsibility for the incident and announced their intention to improve in the future. Overall, then, the experience of emotion appears to unfold in ways that establish or otherwise restore both positivity and separation of the self among Americans, but it does so in ways that further protect, and breed connectedness and better acceptance of the self by ingroup members among Japanese (Mesquita & Leu, Chapter 30, this volume).

**Motivational Consequences**

One classic way to assess motivation is to measure frustration that is experienced when one’s motivation is blocked (Berkowitz, 1989). In a well-conducted field experiment, for example, Harris (1974) demonstrated that people in a waiting line are highly frustrated (often resulting in aggressive behaviors) when someone cuts
into the line (thereby interfering with their goal attainment), and this was especially so when they were near the beginning (as opposed to the end) of the line. When people are near the beginning of the line, the goal gradient is assumed to be quite steep, and the drive toward the goal is high.

If North Americans are motivated toward independence and Asians, toward interdependence, such motivational differences should be revealed in the conditions in which people in different cultures feel constrained or frustrated; that is, people experience a degree of restraint and feel that they “cannot do what they want to do” when a key cultural motivation, such as that toward personal control and independence for Americans, and that toward social harmony and interdependence for Japanese, is blocked.

In a recent study that used a large-scale cross-cultural survey, Kitayama and colleagues (2006) measured the sense of constraint with a scale designed to assess the degree to which people chronically experience constraint (the Perceived Constraint Scale; Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Pearlin & Schooler, 1978). As predicted, Americans reported that they “could not do what they wanted,” thus showing a substantive degree of constraint in their life, especially when they were low in personal control. This replicates a large body of literature that attests to the central significance of personal control (Lachman & Weaver, 1998). In contrast, Japanese subjects reported that they “could not do what they wanted,” thus showing feelings of constraint, especially when they were high in relational strain. Importantly, the effect of relational strain or relational harmony was relatively weak for Americans, indicating that Americans are not motivated as much in these relational tasks. On the contrary, the effect of personal control was quite weak for Japanese subjects, showing that they are not motivated as much in this personal task.

**Consequences on Health and Well-Being**

Because North Americans are strongly motivated toward personal control and independence in general, they may be expected to achieve well-being and health through realizing their independence, that is, by maintaining and enhancing personal control. Although important, promotion of relational harmony or avoidance of relational strain is considered to be more discretionary. In fact, such relational goals are often secondary, particularly when they are in direct conflict with the personal goals of attaining the sense of control and mastery (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1999). Several studies have demonstrated that a strong sense of personal control is positively predictive of well-being and health in the United States (e.g., Heckhausen & Schulz, 1999; Lachman & Weaver, 1998). In addition, the sense of personal control is likely to yield a strong sense of self-worth or high self-esteem. A large number of studies have shown that self-esteem, and an attendant tendency to self-enhance through social comparison, are major predictors of well-being among Americans (e.g., Diener & Diener, 1995; Kwan et al., 1988; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Uchida et al., 2004; Zuckerman & O’Loughlin, 2006). Likewise, positive feelings based on personal success, such as pride and feelings of superiority, are highly associated with general happiness among Americans (Kitayama et al., 2000, 2006). Additionally, Oishi and Diener (2003) reported that attaining personal goals (e.g., doing what one wants to do) leads to enhanced well-being among European Americans (see also Sheldon & Kasner, 1998).

In contrast, Japanese are motivated toward relational harmony and, therefore, interdependence in general. Thus, we may expect that they will achieve well-being and health by realizing their interdependence, that is, by promoting relational harmony and/or avoiding relational strain (Molting et al., 2002; Molting, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2003). Although important, attaining and maintaining the sense of personal control and mastery is not considered essential or primary. Indeed, especially when they are in direct conflict with relational concerns and goals, mastering and control must be subordinate to the ever-important interdependent concerns and goals. Those failing to subordinate them are often considered as immature and childish (Lebra, 1986; Kondo, 1990). As might be expected, well-being in East Asian contexts is strongly predicted by social relational factors, such as social harmony (Kang, Shaver, Min, & Jin, 2003; Kwan et al., 1997); attainment of relational goals (Oishi & Diener, 2003); socially engaging emotions, such as friendly feelings and communal feelings (Kitayama et al., 2000, in press); and perceived emotional support from close others (Uchida et al., 2004). The hypothesized link between rela-
tional harmony and well-being among Asians has also been suggested by the finding that attainment of relational goals (e.g., meeting expectations of significant others) is closely related to enhanced well-being among Asian Americans and Japanese but not among European Americans (Oishi & Diener, 2003).

In a recent cross-cultural survey, Kitayama and colleagues (2006) tested adult, non-college-student samples in both the United States and Japan, using a large number of self-report measures in health and well-being, and provided additional evidence for the foregoing line of analysis. First, personal control proved to be a reliably more significant predictor of well-being among Americans than among Japanese. This is consistent with several recent findings that demonstrate the significance of self-esteem in predicting well-being in individualistic cultures such as the United States (Diener et al., 1999; Kwan et al., 1997; Uchida et al., 2004). In contrast, in Japan, the absence of relational strain most powerfully predicted the summary index of well-being. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that in the Japanese, interdependent cultural contexts, responsiveness to others, and attendant social harmony are strongly valued and sanctioned. Interestingly, however, the researchers found that avoidance of social tension and strain, rather than promotion of social harmony per se, was most predictive of well-being. This finding is in line with a greater prevention (rather than promotion) focus demonstrated for Asians (Elliot, Chirkov, Kim, & Sheldon, 2002). For example, recent studies have indicated that behaviors of people in Japanese and other Asian contexts are strongly motivated by certain avoidance goals, such as a desire to reduce interpersonal anxiety (Kitayama et al., 2004) and to avoid failure (Heine et al., 2001).

Self, Other, and Relationship

The second of the three components of the mode of being concerns representations of self, social others, and the relationship between the two. Whereas self-directedness and the resulting propensity to influence the external environment encourages people to elaborate and value the representations of the self (their own goals, attitudes, values, and opinions), social responsiveness and the resulting tendency to adjust to the environment encourages people to elaborate and value both representations about social others and their relationship with these others.

Self-Enhancement

If the self is more central and salient than others, the self may receive a greater symbolic value than do others. But if others are more salient and central than the self, relatively more value is given to the others than to the self. The substantial literature on positive self-uniqueness speaks to this issue. A number of studies have found that North Americans judge themselves to be positively more unique than social others (Kitayama et al., 1997; Heine et al., 1999). For example, when asked to estimate the proportion of others who are better than themselves, the average responses are consistently lower than the midpoint (50%), indicating that North Americans tend to underestimate the number of people who are better than themselves. In a review of cross-cultural studies pertaining to this effect, Heine and Hamamura (in press) observed that this effect is consistently larger for Americans than for Asians. Whenever exceptions were found for this general trend (e.g., Brown & Kobayashi, 2002; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003), researchers used a particular format of asking respondents to estimate whether the self is better than an abstract representation of social others, such as “average student” and “typical member.” Yet it has been demonstrated that even other individuals are often perceived to be better than either the average other or the typical other, due perhaps to the fact that the terms average and typical are somewhat derogatory. Heine and Hamamura (in press) therefore suggest that the apparent exceptions found in the literature are entirely consistent with the general hypothesis that the positive self-uniqueness effect is substantially stronger for North Americans (those with the independent mode of being) than for Asians (those with the interdependent mode of being).

Symbolic Self-Inflation

Is the self perceived to be literally bigger than others by persons with the independent mode of being? Moreover, is such size asymmetry less common and possibly reversed for those with the interdependent mode of being? In our recent work (Duffy, Uchida, & Kitayama, 2004) we asked both American and Japanese respon-
dent to draw a network of their friends by using circles for both the self and friends, and connecting the circles with arrows. One of the dependent variables is particularly relevant for our present purposes. We simply measured the diameter of the circles. For all of our American respondents, the self circle was bigger than the average size of the circles used to designate friends. But this was the case for only 41% of our Japanese respondents.

Further evidence for a cultural divergence in representation of self versus social others occurred in a different measure concerning popularity ratings. After participants completed their sociogram, they were asked to rate on a 0- to 10-point scale their perception of the popularity of each member of the network, including the self. Notice that this method avoids the problem, noted earlier, of using abstract terms such as average or typical other. Duffy et al. (2004) compared the average rating for all the others against participants’ rating of the self’s popularity. Whereas 77% of North Americans rated themselves as more popular than the average of the individual ratings for their friends, only 16% of Japanese participants did so, suggesting a significant cultural difference in subjective assessments of self versus other within the domain of popularity assessment.

**Self-Uniqueness**

Those with the independent mode of being not only seek a positive and somewhat inflated evaluation of the self but also they strive for uniqueness. Within independent cultures such as the United States, whereas expressing unique features of the self often signifies one’s freedom and autonomy, within interdependent cultures such as Japan and Korea, doing so is usually perceived as infringing upon the ever-important value of social harmony. In agreement with this analysis, Kim and Markus (1999) have shown cross-culturally divergent preferences for uniqueness. These researchers asked Asian Americans and European Americans to choose one pen from a group of five pens as a gift for completion of a questionnaire. There were two colors of pens. In one condition, only one pen was one color (minority pen), whereas the remaining four were the same color (majority pens); in the other condition, two pens were the same color (minority pens), and the remaining three were another color (majority pens). As predicted, European Americans in both conditions chose a minority pen more frequently (over 70%) than majority pens, whereas Asian Americans chose a majority pen more frequently than they chose minority pens (under 31%). Hence, European Americans were far more likely than Asian Americans to pursue their self-uniqueness.

**Cognitive Elaboration**

One cognitive task that is suitable in testing the relative salience or richness of two concepts uses a simple judgment of similarity. It has been established that perceived similarity is greater when a relatively impoverished concept, with a small number of features, is compared to a relatively rich concept, with a greater number of features, than the latter is compared to the former. For example, North Korea is typically perceived to be more similar to the former Soviet Union, because what little is known about North Korea (e.g., communist country, dictatorship, relatively low standard of living, etc.) is very much shared by the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union by no means seems similar to North Korea, because people usually have substantially more knowledge that is unique to the Soviet Union. Applying this principle, it is possible to assess the relative salience or richness of knowledge about self and social others. Kitayama, Markus, and Kato (1989, reported in Markus & Kitayama, 1991) did this by comparing white American students (American students with an Indian cultural heritage. Replicating numerous studies conducted in North America, Kitayama et al. (1989) observed that Americans judged their friends to be less similar to themselves than they were to their friends. This suggests that for these respondents, knowledge is richer and more salient for the self than for friends. In contrast, this pattern of asymmetry in self-other similarity judgment was reversed for the Indian respondents. Thus, as predicted, for Indians, knowledge about social others is more salient or richer than knowledge about the self.

In describing one's interpersonal actions, people commonly refer to both their own action (what they did) and characteristics of the person to which the action was directed (what this person was like). Within this general scheme, the relative salience of the two types of knowledge may vary across cultures. To investigate this possibility, Kitayama, Uchida, and colleagues (2006) asked both Americans and
Japanese participants to remember an episode wherein they did something to their acquaintance who was either happy or in distress. The main dependent variation was the number of words devoted to the description of the action and the description of the other person. As predicted, Americans used substantially more words to describe the self’s own action than to describe the features of the other person, but the Japanese showed a significantly reversed pattern.

Reciprocity Monitoring

If Asians value and elaborate on social relations, they might monitor reciprocal exchanges of support. As Miller and Bersoff (1994) argued, such monitoring enables Asians to return favors to others. To see whether Asians in fact closely monitor reciprocity among their friends, Kitayama, Uchida, and colleagues (2006) invited many pairs of friends to come to the lab. Mutual friends in each pair were then separated into different rooms and asked to indicate for each of many supportive acts how much support they gave to the other and how much support they received from the other. Across three independent samples of Japanese friends, Kitayama and colleagues found that one’s perception of the receipt of support and the other’s perception about the provision of support were highly calibrated, with a Pearson’s correlation of approximately .5. In contrast, among samples of American friends, the modal correlation was zero, showing no calibration at all of reciprocal exchange of support.

Cognition

The third component of the mode of being relates to ways in which people perceive and construe the meanings of attendant situations. On the one hand, self-directed individuals tend to focus attention on one goal-relevant object at a time. The tendency to attend to focal objects at the expense of the field, and using categories, rules, and formal logic in reasoning and judgment, is called “analytic mode of thought” (Nisbett et al., 2001). On the other hand, individuals who are responsive to social contingencies tend to disperse attention to many elements available in the environment. The tendency to attend to many objects and events simultaneously, and to arrive at an understand-

ing of an encompassing event as a whole is called the “holistic mode of thought.” These two divergent “systems of thought” are likely to have a number of consequences upon both relatively low-level processing of attention and perception, and relatively high-level processing of reasoning and categorization (see Norenzayan et al., Chapter 23, this volume, for a detailed review).

Attention and Perception

Several recent studies have begun to explore how cultural modes of being mediate basic attention processes (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Kitayama & Duffy, 2004). The central idea of this literature is that what one notices about the external world determines the information available for perceptual and cognitive processing. Early socialization processes and continued engagement in cultural practices shape the aspects or elements of the world to which individuals attend (Chavajay & Rogoff, 1999). So whereas North Americans focus their attention on focal objects and their intrinsic features, Asians tend to disperse their attention more broadly among objects and their contexts.

A variety of findings are consistent with the hypothesized cultural difference in attention (e.g., Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). For instance, Masuda and Nisbett (2001) showed animated underwater vignettes to Japanese and American participants, and asked them to report what they saw. American participants tended first to describe the most salient objects in the scene. Japanese participants were much more likely to begin by describing the background or field. Japanese reported a total of 60% more background or field objects than did Americans. The cross-cultural attention difference has been observed even when very abstract geometric stimuli are used. Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, and Larsen (2003) developed what they call the Framed Line Test (FLT) to test cultural differences in attention. In the FLT, participants were shown a line in a square frame and asked to draw a line of either the same absolute length or relative length in another square frame that differed in size. Whereas the absolute task requires ignoring the square frames and focusing attention on the target line, the relative task requires one to incorporate information about the frame into the estimate of the original line by dispersing attention to the sur-
rounding frames. In support of the hypothesis that Americans exhibit a focused strategy of attention, their performance on the absolute task was more accurate than performance in the relative task. Moreover, in support of the notion that the Japanese exhibit a dispersed attention strategy, they were more accurate in the relative task than in the absolute task.

It is noteworthy that analogous effects of attention have been shown for perceptual judgments, with Asians sampling information more widely from context than do Americans (Kitayama & Duffy, 2004). Such attentional differences are likely to be automatic. Thus, Ishii et al. (2003) used a stroop interference procedure to demonstrate that whereas American’s attention is automatically captured by local verbal meanings in speech comprehension, Asian’s (Japanese and Filipinos) attention spontaneously goes more to contextual vocal tones. More recently, the comparable cultural difference has been observed at the level of rapid eye movements. Chua, Boland, and Nisbett (2005) presented both Asian and Caucasian American participants with a large object (e.g., airplane) and its context (e.g., sky with clouds and many buildings in distance). Participants were simply asked to report their picture preferences. Caucasian Americans were much more likely to fixate their eyes on the central object. Asian Americans tended to show many rapid eye movements to contextual stimulus elements. Given the differences in eye movements, it is very likely that cultural differences exist from the very beginning of information processing, even when people are exposed to a seemingly identical stimulus configuration.

As might be expected from this recent series of studies that implicate lower-level cognitions, the brains of Asians and Americans appear to be activated very differently. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans, Ketay, Hedden, Aron, Markus, and Gabrieli (2006) observed that Asian Americans show greater conflict when making absolute judgments in the FLT, whereas Caucasian Americans show greater conflict when making relative judgments. Another noteworthy finding comes from a recent study by Kutchess, Welsh, Boduroglu, and Park (in press). Their use of stimulus materials similar to those of Masuda and Nisbett (2001), revealed that Americans showed more activation in object processing regions (in particular, the left lateral middle temporal cortex) than did East Asians when studying complex pictures. They also found that East Asians showed more activation of a background processing area (the left fusiform gyrus).

Reasoning and Categorization

Nisbett and colleagues (2001) have argued that the independent mode of being encourages argumentation, reliance on explicit rules, and the general art of rhetoric that was supposedly invented by Greeks to settle disputes, whereas the independent mode of being fosters more relational epistemology and dialectic ways of reasoning that lend themselves to social harmony (see Nisbett, 2003; Norenzayan et al., Chapter 23, this volume, for reviews). For example, Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, and Nisbett (2002) asked both North Americans and Asians to judge whether an object belonged to one of two categories. One of the categories was defined by dint of an explicit rule, and the other was defined by means of family resemblance. The researchers found that North Americans relied on explicit rules, but Asians tended to base their judgment on family resemblances. A similar point has been made in a classic study by Chiu (1972), and in its more recent extensions by Ji, Zhang, and Nisbett (2004).

Evidence suggests that independent people tend to emphasize logical approaches to problem solving, whereas interdependent people tend to use dialectical approaches. We believe that this difference derives from the social orientation of the respective groups of people toward either confrontation or social harmony: Logical argument is useful in settling disagreement, but dialectic reasoning is more useful in moderating or preempting disagreement. For example, when presented with apparently contradictory propositions, Americans tended to reject one in favor of the other, and even to increase their belief in the more plausible proposition when they saw it contradicted by a less plausible one (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). This “hyperlogical” pattern contrasts with the behavior of the Chinese participants, who tended to find both propositions plausible. Peng and Nisbett also found that Chinese participants showed greater appreciation of proverbs expressing contradictions than did American participants, and Chinese participants were more inclined to “split the difference” in social or intrapersonal conflicts, rather than insisting that one side or the other had to be right. Finally, they found that Chinese participants were more impressed with arguments that re
6. Self as Cultural Mode of Being

affected multiple points of view than were Americans.

Summary

When wide-angle comparisons are drawn between North American and Asian cultures, there often arise a number of intriguing psychological differences. They can be readily classified into three sets, namely, style of action, self-other representations, and cognition. As shown in Figure 6.2, the independent mode of being is associated with the style of action as influence, self-centricity, and the analytic mode of cognition. In contrast, the interdependent mode of being is associated with the style of action as adjustment, other-centricity, and the holistic mode of cognition. One weakness of this literature stems from the fact that most of the reviewed studies are based on college student samples. Yet theoretically comparable findings have been observed among young children (e.g., Fernald & Morikawa, 1993), in community samples (Markus et al., 2004), and in a variety of cultural artifacts (e.g., Imada et al., 2005). This literature presents a reasonably strong case for the fundamental role that culture plays in the construction of the self as a mode of being.

DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL ANTECEDENTS

So far, we have discussed how social relational differences (gesellschaft and gemeinschaft) might be associated with two contrasting modes of being (independent and interdependent). Moreover, we provided evidence for this analysis by reviewing an emerging body of cross-cultural studies focused on style of action, self-other representation, and mode of thought. So far, however, this evidence leaves open a number of significant questions about the development and antecedents of the two modes of being. In this third section of the chapter, we examine some initial efforts to address these issues. We start with a review of recent theoretical analyses of socialization of dependence and interdependence.

Socialization of the Mode of Being

The mode of being is a social product, fostered and shaped through socialization. Recent theoretical advancements on cultural socialization suggest that the independent mode of being is fostered by socialization practices that encourage autonomy, whereas the interdependent mode of being is promoted by those that encourage symbiotic relations.

Culture and Developmental Pathways

In their discussion on culturally variable pathways of development, Greenfield and colleagues (2003) proposed that the development of the self is contingent upon successfully resolving three universal tasks of human development: relationship formation in infancy, knowledge formation during childhood, and the balance between autonomy and relatedness in adolescence and early adulthood. Yet cultures vary along three important dimensions that mediate the strategies and, ultimately, the trajectories by which individuals resolve these important tasks. First, cultures vary in practices, such as the manner in which parents interact with their children. Second, cultures vary in ecological conditions, such as the size of families or how many people sleep together in the same room. Finally, cultures vary in meaning systems and beliefs regarding the normative and prescriptive beliefs, behaviors, action tendencies, and developmental trajectories. Each of these factors plays an important role in guiding an individual’s growth along a pathway toward either independence or interdependence. In terms of relationship formation, which is most relevant to our discussion, Greenfield and colleagues point out that interdependent cultures promote the development of a symbiotic relationship between mother and child, whereas independent cultures foster children’s individual autonomy.

The same theme is echoed by another important model by Rothbaum and his colleagues (2000), which proposes that in interdependent cultures such as Japan, the pathway through development is one of symbiotic harmony, whereas in independent cultures, the path is one of generative tension. More specifically, the path of symbiotic harmony entails unity in infancy, in which the distinction between mother and child is blurred, focusing on the other’s expectations during childhood, maintaining stable relationships among family members during adolescence, and unconditional loyalty to partners in adulthood. The cultural practices and shared meanings along the pathway of symbiotic harmony foster allocentric attention to relationships, particularly among the kinship network, thereby promoting an interde-
pendsent mode of being. In contrast, the path of generative tension emphasizes a constructive role that interpersonal conflict plays in fostering developmental change. Along this path, infant autonomy is emphasized and actively promoted; children are expected to exhibit personal preferences and respect the preferences of others; and the transformation of affiliation from family to peers is expected and promoted during childhood. Moreover, adult relationships are based upon trust individuals confer on each other, rather than on assurance provided by formal and informed social sanctions.

Cultural Differences in Parental Practices

A variety of practices guide children toward different developmental goals. For instance, in many interdependent cultures such as India and Japan, parents co-sleep with their infants and young children, whereas in the independent cultures such as Germany and the United States, most infants sleep in separate rooms (Shweder, 2003). These practices are enforced by relevant cultural beliefs. Needless to say, a variety of ecological conditions can influence sleeping arrangements. For instance, separate sleeping arrangements may not be possible for families living in a one-room adobe hut. Yet, Shweder and colleagues (1997) found evidence that cultural preferences for different sleeping arrangements persist even when such ecological constraints are minimal.

Several studies have focused on Japan and examined cross-cultural variation in mother-infant interaction. In one of these studies, Bornstein et al. (1992) observed contents of maternal speech to infants and found marked cross-cultural differences in the frequencies of affect-salient (e.g., “The ball makes you happy!”) versus information-salient maternal speech (e.g., “The ball is red!”). Japanese mothers produced more affect-salient speech, whereas U.S. mothers exhibited speech that was more information-salient and asked information-seeking questions. Similarly, Fernald and Morikawa (1993) found that, compared with their American counterparts, infant directed speech of Japanese mothers contains fewer words but a greater number of affect-salient, nonverbal vocalizations. In terms of nonverbal linguistic behavior, Bornstein et al. (1992) found that Japanese mothers are more responsive than American or French mothers to infant's social looking. Furthermore, Japanese mothers direct infants’ attention to the mother, and specifically to emotional facial expressions, whereas American mothers direct infants’ attention to objects and events in the environment (Bornstein, Toda, Azuma, Tamis-LeMonda, & Ogino, 1990).

Further evidence for the cross-cultural variation in socialization practice comes from a well-replicated finding that Japanese mothers tend to exhibit greater symbiotic proximity than American mothers, spending more time in direct physical contact with their infants (see Barratt, 1993, for a review). For example, infants in Japan receive nonmaternal caregiving for about 2 hours a week, whereas American infants receive, on average, 23 hours. As might be expected, Japanese babies show a higher degree of anxiety than do American babies when separated from the mother in the Strange Situation paradigm (Miyake, Chen, & Campos, 1985). Secure and avoidant attachment styles are correspondingly less frequent in Japan. Similar cross-cultural differences persist throughout the toddler period (Zahn-Waxler, Friedman, Cole, & Mizuta, 1996). Taken as a whole, the evidence consistently suggests a systematic cultural bias in socialization practices, with Western mothers distancing the child as a little adult and directing the child's attention to his or her goal-relevant object, and Japanese mothers treating the child literally as a child, and engaging the child in an intimate symbiotic relationship.

Some more recent studies have examined cultures other than the United States and Japan. Drawing on previous evidence that mothers in interdependent cultures exhibit symbiotic or proximate parenting behaviors (which emphasize body contact and body stimulation between the caregiver and child), whereas parents in independent cultures exhibit distal behaviors (which promote face-to-face contact and object stimulation), Keller et al. (2004) proposed that whereas proximate behaviors foster an orientation toward interpersonal relatedness, distal practices create an orientation toward autonomy. To test this possibility, Keller et al. measured both proximate and distal parenting practices of mothers when their children were 3 months of age and explored behavioral consequences for the children at 18 months. The maternal styles (proximate vs. distal) were determined by a systematic coding of a 3-hour
naturalistic observation. Of importance, Keller and colleagues tested an independent, urban, middle-class culture (Greeks); an interdependent, urban, middle-class culture (Costa Ricans); and an interdependent, rural farming culture (Cameroonian Nso). At 18 months, the toddlers' self-recognition (an index of independence) and compliance (an index of interdependence) were measured. Keller et al. found that children of the proximate-style Cameroonian mothers exhibited greater compliance behaviors, whereas the children of the distal-style Greek mothers exhibited greater self-recognition at 18 months. The Costa Rican mothers and children fell between these two groups. These findings support the hypothesis that cultural variations in modes of being begin to emerge at an early point in development; moreover, specific socialization practices play a significant role in this developmental change.

Voluntary Settlement

One source of within-culture variability that has received research attention of late is voluntary settlement. Cultural groups differ greatly in the degree to which they are sedentary or socially mobile. Some individuals emigrate with great effort and determination for a variety of reasons, whereas others decide to stay in the communities of their origin, under seemingly identical circumstances. Cultures may subsequently differ substantially as result of such emigration or the absence thereof. This consideration is especially important in understanding American individualism.

In the last 400 years, the United States has been a major magnet of for immigrants from all over the world. Except for African Americans who were forced to work as slaves, the vast majority of immigrants voluntarily settled in North America. Over nearly three centuries, from the 16th through the 19th century, new lands of the West were continuously exploited and settled by Americans of mostly European descent, with the frontier steadily moved westward. Does the voluntary settlement in a frontier promote an independent mode of being? A number of theorists have suggested an affirmative answer to this question (Bellah et al., 1985; Hochschild, 1995; Schlesinger, 1986; de Tocqueville, 1835/1969; Turner, 1920).

Drawing on this literature, Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, and Ramaswamy (2006) proposed that voluntary settlement in a fron-
ence of certain social cues or contexts that evoke public self-image concerns.

Social Class

Cultural differences that have been demonstrated are often substantial. In terms of effect size, these differences are often in the range of "moderate" to "strong" effect. For example, Miyamoto, Kitayama, and Talhelm (2006) reviewed a large number of published studies on culture and cognition, and found that the mean effect size for the West-East difference, as indicated by Cohen's $d$, is approximately 0.70. It goes without saying, however, that substantial individual differences are also present within each of the compared cultures. Although some of these differences are due to a variety of noises in measurement, others are likely to be more systematic. One important variable that describes such within-culture differences is social class.

"Social class" refers to a dimension defined by several, loosely correlated, value-ridden features of one's position in a society, such as education, ownership, control over the means of production, income, and associated status and prestige. Because these features are value-ridden, some positions are higher than others, resulting in a hierarchy of power, wealth, and prestige. Although some societies are highly hierarchical (e.g., India) and others are relatively egalitarian (e.g., The Netherlands), virtually all contemporary societies have some degree of such stratification (Schooler, Chapter 15, this volume). In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that different social classes foster a variety of different psychological propensities and characteristics.

Snibbe and Markus (2005) focused on one critical dimension of social class (i.e., educational attainment) and argued that college-educated and high-school-educated Americans are characterized by somewhat different models of self and agency. Whereas members of the college-educated group ground their selves in free choice and attainment of personal autonomy, the high-school-educated group members emphasize protecting their integrity against adversities of the surrounding world. To examine this analysis, these researchers performed a content analysis on the various kinds of music most commonly preferred by individuals with a high school education (country music) compared to that preferred by college-educated indi-


dividuals (rock music). They found that country music lyrics contain themes expressing individual integrity, self-adjustment, and resisting influence, whereas rock music lyrics express individual uniqueness, control over the environment, and influence. Snibbe and Markus provide further evidence by using the free-choice dissonance paradigm. Recall that in this paradigm participants are given a choice between two equally attractive items. Typically, Americans shift their preference for a chosen item upward, while shifting their preference for a rejected item downward. Snibbe and Markus found that this typical American pattern was found for college-educated Americans, but for the high-school-educated group, only the downward shift of preference for the rejected item was observed. This finding is consistent with the overall hypothesis that working-class individuals seek to protect their integrity by justifying what they have to give up.

Another important insight into the effect of social class on identity, self, and cognition comes from a series of studies by Schooler and colleagues, who have hypothesized that individuals in positions of higher social status—those in control of the means of production—exhibit aspects of individuality, such as occupational self-direction, intrinsic motivation, and analytic modes of cognition, to a greater extent than individuals with lower social status. Schooler and colleagues link these differences to structural aspects of common working conditions among those with high- or low-status jobs. High-status jobs generally demand greater cognitive flexibility, self-directed action, and independent value orientations. Alternatively, low-status jobs generally promote interdependent thinking (e.g., teamwork), involve little self-directed action, and generally tend to involve routine actions that are part of larger processes (i.e., piecemeal work on an assembly line). Furthermore, these findings are not limited to American social structures: Schooler's general findings have been replicated in a variety of different cultural contexts, such as Poland and Japan (Kohn, Naoi, Schoenbach, Schooler, & Slomczynski, 1990; Naoi & Schooler, 1985). Additionally, Schooler and his colleagues found that differences in social status are related to child-rearing behaviors, with parents of high social status more likely than low-status parents to promote values of intellectual flexibility, self-direction, and motivation (Kohn, et al., 1990). At present, it is not
clear whether self-direction, arguably associated with middle-class environments, nurtures general cognitive competencies (e.g., IQ), analytic skills (e.g., focusing [vis-à-vis holistic] strategy of attention), or both. It is highly desirable to use cognitive tasks such as FLT that disassociate analytic versus holistic cognitive competencies from general cognitive competence.

Taken together, these studies suggest that social status may have an important role in shaping orientations toward the interdependent and independent dimensions of cultural modes of being. At present, it is not known whether working-class Americans are “less independent” than middle-class Americans in all three facets of independence and interdependence we have posited. Snibbe and Markus (2005) have argued that both groups are equally independent, but the specific way in which they are independent varies. Thus, whereas middle-class culture emphasizes self-reliance and self-directedness, working-class culture puts a premium on the protection of integrity. It is also possible that social classes differ in specific profiles of independence defined by the three facets. For example, Americans might have an equally strong tendency to take a style of action as influence, but their mode of thought might be dependent more on their educational attainment, with college-educated groups being much more analytical than high-school-educated groups. This and other, related issues must be addressed in future work.

Cultural Affordances

Kitayama and colleagues have defined “cultural affordances” as the potential of cultural environments to evoke different sets of cognitive, emotional, and motivational responses (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Kitayama et al., in press; see also Gibson, 1979). Cultural affordances result from a biased pool of symbolic resources of culture that are brought to bear on the construction of concrete daily situations (Kitayama et al., 1997; Morling et al., 2002). These symbolic resources are used to define general classes of events and episodes available in a given cultural context (school, exam, business, success, failure, etc.). But more importantly, they profoundly influence more subtle, yet powerful nuances and psychological meanings (pride, shame, obligation, honor, etc.) that are added to the lived experience of such events and episodes. These meanings may often be highly idiosyncratic and hardly predictable in any specific instances, yet because they are derived or fostered by a pool of symbolic resources available in a given culture, they may be systematically biased over many situations and episodes in accordance with the specific, historically crafted and accumulated contents of this pool. In this way, individual experiences may be collectively constructed through sociohistorical processes (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Kitayama et al., 1997).

For example, “getting an A in an important course” is likely to be both positive and disengaging (causing one to feel proud) in all cultures. Nevertheless, certain engaging themes, icons, and ideas, such as smiling faces of parents who are very happy to know their daughter’s performance in the course, may be more available in interdependent than in independent cultural contexts. If so, a subtle, yet distinctly engaging element or nuance may be added to the experience for those in the interdependent contexts, but such an addition of engaging nuances may be relatively unlikely for those in the independent contexts. This example illustrates how subtle the effect of cultural affordances can sometimes be. It also suggests, however, that such a subtle effect can be very powerful over time, because it is highly recurrent, present all the time, insofar as all individuals must necessarily be drawing on the pool of symbolic resources of their own culture.

Likewise, it is a common experience among many Asian sojourners in the United States to find that many of their American friends are very nice, complimenting and praising them, but they also feel the compliments and praise to be somewhat excessive. This would have been surely embarrassing in their native (Asian) contexts! After a while, however, the sojourners are resocialized in the United States; that is, they get used to the American-style friendship and, as a consequence, no longer feel their American friends’ praise and compliments are unnecessarily positive, but instead feel natural and even appropriate. Not surprisingly, Asians’ self-esteem substantially goes up after some period of resocialization in North America (Heine et al., 1999). These examples illustrate that culture is not inert or passive. To the contrary, it often is an active element of psychological experience. The notion of cultural affordances highlights this potentially powerful role of culture’s practices and meanings to
guide psychological processes in subtle, yet highly systematic fashion.

**Situation Sampling**

It is reasonable that North American cultural contexts have historically incorporated a variety of cultural resources (meanings and practices) that encourage independence of the self; moreover, through enculturation, individuals become capable of recognizing and attuning themselves to the culture's affordances. Thus, Kitayama et al. (1997) proposed that "psychological tendencies . . . are importantly afforded and sustained by the ways in which the attendant social realities are collectively constructed in each cultural context" (p. 1246). It would follow, then, that North Americans and Asians should be most independent and interdependent, respectively, when exposed to social situations that are most routinely available in their own cultural contexts.

Kitayama and colleagues (1997; Morling et al., 2002) explored some implications of this collective construction theory in a series of Japan–U.S. comparison studies that use a situation-sampling method. In this method, situations that meet a certain criterion are randomly sampled according to two different cultural contexts. The situations sampled from the two cultures are then presented to respondents from both cultures. Respondents are then asked to imagine that they are in each of the situations and to estimate their own psychological responses in the situation. With this method, Kitayama and colleagues (1997) discovered that Americans feel more efficacious and esteemed (and therefore independent) when exposed to situations that are most commonly available in their own cultural contexts. In contrast, Asians are especially likely to be self-effacing when exposed to their own cultural situations.

Although Kitayama and colleagues (1997) focused on situational definitions as the primary locus in which each culture's symbolic resources play their role in shaping psychological tendencies of those engaging in the culture, it is also clear that there are many other types of cultural affordances. Indeed, the cultural affordances hypothesis amounts to the idea that culture "primes" different emotion themes (Oyserman & Lee, Chapter 10, this volume). We now turn to this literature. As will be seen, the priming research may fruitfully expand its scope to examine the entire pool of icons, lay theories, and other symbolic resources that are unevenly distributed across different cultural contexts.

**Language, Cultural Icons, Ecology**

First, linguistic practices serve as a powerful affordance for certain psychological processes. One case in point comes from an observation that whereas in most West European languages, including English, subject and object are obligatory in grammatically constructed sentences, they are not in most of the remaining languages in the world (Kashima & Kashima, 2003). This phenomenon is called "pronoun drop." Thus, whereas English speakers always remind the listeners that it is "I" who thinks, feels, and so forth, Asian speakers more often than not leave this aspect to the listeners' inferences. Thus, especially in Asian contexts, it is quite informative if the speaker uses pronouns even where they are reasonably inferable from context and thus ordinarily omitted. Kakuno and Ura (2002), who replicated other, related findings (e.g., Masuda & Kitayama, 2004; Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002), showed that when asked to infer the real attitude of someone who was allegedly requested by an external authority to make a speech on a controversial political issue, Japanese subjects did not infer the attitude to closely correspond to the speech content. Although this finding may be expected to be typical in Japanese contexts, it in fact was observed only when the form of the speech allegedly made by the speaker conformed to the linguistic convention of pronoun drop. When all pronouns (especially Is) were inserted, Japanese subjects exhibited a quite strong bias to infer that the speaker's real attitude closely corresponded to the speech content.

A second type of cultural affordance has received considerable research attention of late—a variety of cultural icons. For example, the Statue of Liberty, a football stadium packed with enthusiastic fans, Marilyn Monroe, and the like, are some of the U.S. icons, whereas dragons, Great Walls, Mao, and the like, are comparable icons in China. The respective sets of icons may induce the corresponding psychological tendencies for those who are familiar with the two cultures. In many cases, except perhaps for the Statue of Liberty relative to independence, there is nothing inherently either independent or interdependent about these
It is not clear whether the priming of independence and interdependence is different in kind from the priming effect demonstrated with cultural icons. It is possible that cultural icons are much more tightly embedded in a specific culture's practices and institutions, and as a consequence, priming effects due to these icons are entirely dependent on immersion in that particular cultural context.

At first glance, this consideration might seem unlikely to apply to the pronoun (I vs. we) priming effect, because this effect is grounded in the fact that every society has elements of both independence and interdependence. The relative frequency or prevalence of different pronouns may vary across cultures and societies. The story might not be so straightforward, however. If it is really true that the personal self is always defined as embedded in interpersonal contexts in Asia, the representation of the personal self (I) might have a greater overlap with the representation of the social or communal self (we). If so, the pronoun priming effect might be predicted to be much weaker in interdependent than in independent contexts. This question has yet to be addressed: There is no published work on pronoun priming outside of Western cultural contexts.

A promising way to conceptualize culture, then, is to think about it as a series of priming operations by a great many cultural artifacts, practices, discourses, and institutions, of which the specific priming manipulations examined by psychologists so far are only a few select examples. These and many other priming operations embedded in a culture's practices and meanings constitute what Kitayama and colleagues (2006) have called the "cultural affordances" of a given social setting. As we see later, it is likely that many more cultural artifacts, such as ads and textbooks, do carry images that reinforce rather than compromise the primary values of culture.

Fourth, cultural affordances may also come from cultural ecology. After all, especially in the modern world, there is no purely natural ecology (Watsuiji, 1935/1961). Nature itself is already fully cultural because it has been drastically transformed through human interventions (Diamond, 1997). In a recent study, Miyamoto, Nisbett, and Masuda (2006) systematically collected photographs of scenes from several cities of differing size in both Japan and the United States, and examined both subjective and objective characteristics of the
scenes. They found that, compared to their American counterparts, Japanese scenes tended to be more complex, to contain more objects, and to be more chaotic or cognitively confusing. Moreover, they went a step further and argued, using initial empirical evidence, that the relatively complex Japanese scenes may in fact induce relatively holistic cognitive styles. The attention of both American and Japanese participants became more holistic when participants were exposed to a series of scenes from Japan than when exposed to those from the United States.

Public Artifacts

The cultural ethos of independence and interdependence is likely to be incorporated into a variety of cultural artifacts, such as ads, icons, and media materials, which in turn may function as potent cues that prime the culturally sanctioned mode of being (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000). In recent years, there has been a concerted effort to demonstrate systematic cross-cultural differences in public artifacts.

For example, Markus, Uchida, Omoregie, Townsend, and Kitayama (2006) sampled actual media coverage of the 2000 and 2002 Olympics from newspapers, magazines, and television programs in the United States and Japan, and analyzed contents of the coverage, including statements of athletes, reporters, and commentators. In both Japanese and American contexts, Olympic performance was explained mainly in terms of the actions of athletes. Yet, Olympic actions (agency) were illustrated and understood differently by the athletes themselves and the media. In the American context, agency was explained as independent and disjointed (Markus & Kitayama, 2004), separate from the athlete’s historical background or social and emotional experience. Rather, performance was mainly explained through positive personal characteristics and features of the competition. In Japanese contexts, however, agency was explained as interdependent or conjoint (Markus & Kitayama, 2004), strongly connected with athletes’ backgrounds and others in the interpersonal relationships. For example, for Naoko Takahashi, a Japanese gold medalist in the women’s marathon, media coverage almost always mentioned her relationship with her coach. Such differences, which can be seen in explanations of the nature of intentional agency in the media coverage, have same patterns as the cross-cultural differences, which can be seen in individual behavior or cognition.

Contents of ads also vary systematically across cultures. Kim and Markus (1999) analyzed how the themes of conformity and uniqueness are used in advertisements from various types of magazines (from business to youth/pop culture) in the United States and Korea. As we explained in the previous section, East Asians prefer conformity, whereas North Americans prefer uniqueness in the individual behavioral level. Consistent with that finding, Korean magazine advertisements are more likely to use conformity-related messages or appeals (95%), such as promoting group harmony or following a trend, than uniqueness-related messages (49%). In contrast, American magazine advertisements are more likely to use uniqueness-related messages or appeals (89%), such as emphasizing freedom or choices, than conformity messages (65%). Similarly, Han and Shavitt (1994) pointed out that Korean magazine advertisements use collectivistic appeals much more than do American advertisements, which in turn use individualistic appeals much more than do Korean advertisements.

Yet another example of public artifacts that potentially have the most powerful consequences for the development of culturally divergent modes of being comes from textbook materials (see also McLelland, 1985). In a recent content analysis of elementary school language textbooks in Japan and the United States, Imada (2005) found that the cultural values and beliefs used in the textbooks are significantly different across cultures. She showed that collectivistic values, such as conformity and interdependence, are more likely to be used in the Japanese textbooks than in American textbooks, whereas individualistic values, such as self-direction, achievement, and power, are more likely to be used in the American textbooks than in Japanese textbooks. Moreover, American stories have more pictures that focus only on one person and are more likely to attribute the outcomes to internal factors, such as personal characteristics or effort, than do Japanese textbooks. In contrast, Japanese stories have more pictures with two or three characters and are more likely to attribute the outcomes to external factors, such as other people’s behavior or the situation.
CONCLUSIONS

Culture in the Mind

A central thesis of cultural psychology holds that psychological processes in the sense of standardized operational procedures of cognition, emotion, and motivation are socio-culturally afforded; as a consequence, what initially appears to be a fully natural part of the human mind may in fact be saturated with culture (e.g., Bruner, 1990; Cole, 1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shore, 1996; Shweder, 2003). Only during the last decade or two has this point of view has taken a strong hold in the mainstream of psychology and begun to influence other social science disciplines (but see LeVine, Chapter 2, and Triandis, Chapter 3, this volume, for important historical precursors).

In fact, the idea that culture becomes part of the mind was also largely ignored in most of anthropology and sociology, where the main focus was on what Durkheim called “social facts” such as rituals and social institutions (but see LeVine, Chapter 2, this volume, for important exceptions, e.g., Sapir’s elaborate view on the culture-mind interaction). Psychology was largely missing, and in its place were vaguely defined notions of “primitive minds” and “rational agents.” In a way, cultural psychological investigation of the last decade rationalized primitive minds by revealing the coherent logic of them, while socializing the rational agents by specifying the sociocultural affordances for them.

Given the disciplinary history and backgrounds that placed a sharp division between culture and mind, the notion that culture and the psyche make each other up (Shweder, 1991) came as a fresh revelation to many culturally oriented psychologists and psychologically oriented anthropologists and sociologists. With this idea salvaged and returned to the center stage of the study of culture, cross-cultural comparison became something much more than a litmus test of universality.

The hypothesis of mutual constitution implies that the human mind, by its very nature, is designed to be socioculturally shaped and completed. It follows that the human mind is best understood when cast in varying contexts of different cultures and societies. Since the theoretical shift promoted by Shweder and other pioneers during the 1980s and 1990s, cross-cultural comparison has begun to be recognized as an indispensable part of all human psychology. In this emerging perspective, cross-cultural comparison can no longer be dismissed as a pastime for psychologists. To the contrary, it is an indispensable tool for theory building in all areas of human psychology.

In this chapter, we have argued that many of the recent advances in cultural psychology can be integrated by conceptualizing the self not so much as semantic or conceptual structures, but more as a mode of being, or modus operandi, that is, a set of standard operating procedures in major psychological functions such as cognition, emotion, and motivation. We traced the origins of the mode of operation to cross-culturally divergent structures of sociality. Moreover, we identified three facets of the mode of being, and argued that these facets are often correlated but can surely be dissociated under certain historical conditions.

Critical Appraisals

The approach to culture, delineated in this chapter, has received some concerted criticisms. In closing this chapter, it would be appropriate to discuss some of these critical appraisals. In particular, two lines of criticism against our approach are worthy comment.

Stereotyping?

First and foremost, independence or interdependence is not a label assigned to a set of psychological traits. It is often argued, however, that “independence” is defined in terms of both certain autonomous, individually oriented behaviors (e.g., choice, social mobility, and self-expression) and corresponding subjective experiences (e.g., sense of autonomy and power), whereas “interdependence” is defined in terms of cooperative and prosocial behaviors (e.g., conformity, compliance, and cooperation), and accompanying subjective experiences (e.g., harmony and trust). This argument leads to a caricature of people who fit either one or the other of these two sets of behaviors. For example, a renowned developmental psychologist recently noted:

The characterization of cultures as individualistic or collectivist... is likely to be false, and it serves thereby to stereotype people and groups. ... The idea [is] patently false for one simple reason: most groups... are structured hierarchically... and
people in positions of power in those hierarchies are often highly "individualistic." (Turiel, 2004, p. 92)

We do well to remember that personal autonomy and social relations are both significant elements of human social functions; thus, they are likely to be universally available in all cultural contexts. This means, for example, that practices, such as choice, self-expression, conformity, and cooperation, and subjective experiences, such as harmony and disagreement, are available in all cultures. Nevertheless, it is possible that any one of these practices and experiences is powerfully structured and configured in terms of an underlying model of self as either independent or interdependent. For example, there may be different ways of making a choice that are more amenable either to an independent or to an interdependent model of self (Kitayama et al., 2004). Likewise, although cooperation and trust are available and can easily be found in all cultural contexts, they can also take quite diverse forms depending on the underlying model of self as independent or interdependent (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1985). Whereas in the United States trust is grounded in the perceived disposition of another person, in Japan it requires a specific interpersonal tie that binds the behavior of the person (Brewer & Yuki, Chapter 12, this volume). Cultural models of independence and interdependence provide resources and constraints for handling many universal tasks, such as choice, competition or cooperation, and agreement or disagreement.

Seen from this vantage point, the cultural analysis presented here is entirely consistent with the enormous flexibility and variability of human behaviors and cognitions. This flexibility or variability, however, is made possible by numerous cultural and largely social resources and constraints. The independent or interdependent model supplies a significant set of such social resources and constraints.

**Personal Values and Beliefs?**

Cultural models of self comprise many practices and public meanings that define the landscape of the cultural environment. Many of the practices and meanings are based on certain values and beliefs. For example, practices based on the Protestant relational ideology (Sanchez-Burks, 2005) were established on the basis of, and, can be traced back to certain theological ideas of Calvin and other founders of Protestantism. Nevertheless, once established, these practices comprise a collectively constituted environment of capitalism, in which each individual in the society had to survive, and with which each individual had to cope. In this particular case, whether one believes in Protestantism or values any aspects of this theological variety of Christianity would simply be irrelevant. Likewise, a cultural model of the self as interdependent is likely to have established many aspects of a cultural environment, such as communicative practices (e.g., high-context communication), interpersonal routines (e.g., various rules of etiquette), and social institutions (e.g., a company as family). To participate and even to flourish within this collective environment, however, it is not necessary to be aware of the etiology of this environment, much less to endorse personally archaic values or beliefs underlying this environment.

Traditionally, the only means available for psychologists to measure culture was attitudinal questionnaires. Thus, numerous studies were conducted to determine whether Americans are in fact more individualistic and independent, and whether Easterners are more collectivistic and interdependent. Many factors, including acquiescence bias (Schimmack et al., 2005), reference group effect (Heine et al., 2001), and culturally variable referents of abstract concepts (Peng et al., 1997), severely compromise this literature. Thus, without adequate control of these issues, whether statistical or conceptual, the results of these questionnaires can be extremely misleading. Indeed, as noted earlier, one might often get an impression that cross-cultural differences are neither strong nor systematic (Oyserman et al., 2002). From this type of observation, some researchers have immediately jumped to the conclusion that cultural variation in practices and meanings is illusory. For example, a cross-cultural psychologist stated:

The evidence ... overwhelmingly indicates that the Japanese are not more collectivistic than Americans; if anything, in some cases the Japanese are more individualistic than Americans. Thus, these differences cannot possibly account for differences in self-construals between the two countries. . . . (Matsumoto, 1999, p. 298)
However, once researchers adequately control for certain biasing effects of survey questionnaires (e.g., Heine et al., 2002; Schimmack et al., 2003), cross-cultural variation is quite systematic and sizable even in paper-and-pencil measures of values and beliefs. Moreover, as we have indicated, once behavioral measures are tested, cross-cultural differences that are indicative of the corresponding modes of being are bound to be even more systematic and sizable.

Toward an Implicit Measure of Independence and Interdependence

This said, however, we wish to emphasize that the field will be better served by a renewed effort to develop a more valid measure of independence and interdependence. As we mentioned earlier, to capture individual differences on this dimension, researchers have traditionally relied on several different attitudinal scales (e.g., Singelis, 1994). All these scales probe one’s independence or interdependence in terms of explicit self-reports (“In general I make my own decisions” for independence and “When my opinion is in conflict with that of another person’s, I often accept the other opinion” for interdependence). In addition to all the artifacts that might compromise the cross-cultural evidence based entirely on this type of measures, there is a lingering suspicion that such explicit measures of self might have an inherent limitation (Kitayama, 2002). This may be the case, because people’s behavioral propensities toward independence or interdependence might be embodied, automated, or spontaneous, and thus largely implicit; that is, they might be rarely self-reflective, deliberate, or even conscious. If there is only a limited conscious access to such behavioral propensities (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), explicit self-report might be ill-suited as a tool for measuring them.

Many of the studies reviewed in the main body of this chapter used the notion of independent and interdependent self to predict some systematic cross-cultural variations in the pattern of cognitive, emotional, and motivational responses and behaviors. Yet, given the cumulative evidence that was reviewed, we wonder whether the converse of this standard logic might prove to be equally fruitful in future work; that is, it might be possible to use the pattern of, say, emotional responses as a means for implicit assessment of independence and interdependence.

We recently suggested, for example, that one promising measure is the extent to which engaging or disengaging positive emotions are linked to happiness (Kitayama, 1999). Furthermore, we may also use the relative intensity of engaging versus disengaging emotions. Individuals may be said to be more independent (or interdependent) if their happiness is predicted more by disengaging positive (or engaging positive) emotions, if they experience disengaging (or engaging) emotions more, or both. Kitayama (in press) reported initial evidence for the convergent validity of these measures and recommended that future research directly assess the predictive validity of these implicit measures of independence and interdependence with respect to a variety of cross-cultural differences in cognition, such as analytic versus holistic thought (e.g., Nisbett et al., 2001), and motivation, such as self-enhancement and self-improvement (e.g., Heine et al., 1999). To the extent that the self is embodied we suspect that many of the behavioral or online responses of the self might be better predicted by implicit measures of independence and interdependence than by their explicit counterparts, such as the one developed by Singelis (1994).

Future Directions

As we have seen, the extensive empirical studies on culture have revealed a large number of differences. Paradoxically, however, this work has also underscored an equally important set of cross-cultural similarities. Often, the same psychological function is configured or enabled in terms of culturally contingent psychological processes. Having the same psychological function, therefore, does not imply any universal psychological laws. As Richard Shweder (2003) observes, universal principles of psychology may reveal themselves more often in the diversities than in the uniformity of psychological functions. The same theme is echoed in some recent efforts to reunitie evolution and culture (Konner, Chapter 4, this volume; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Future work may therefore focus on culturally contingent solutions for carrying out many universal psychological functions or tasks (Norenzayan & Heine, 2003).

It is also important to reiterate that the work on culture and the self so far has focused
mostly on adult, largely college student populations. Much more developmental work is necessary to understand how members of a cultural group may acquire the culturally contingent ways of being a person. Moreover, there is an increasing need to examine community samples. Another weakness of the field stems from the fact that much evidence so far comes from East–West comparative studies. It is a reasonable research strategy to start with groups of maximal contrast. Yet it should also be kept in mind that much of the existing variation might be masked by this particular approach. Studies on social class, voluntary settlement, and cultural affordances, summarized in this chapter, may represent one extremely important direction for future work that can fruitfully supplement the macroscopic comparisons between large cultural regions such as East and West.

Finally, culture is both inside and outside the mind. As much as psychological processes are shaped by practices and meanings of culture, they do create and perpetuate the public practices and meanings. More detailed studies on practices and meanings—including those pertaining to their origins, changes, accumulation—are very much needed. As we mentioned earlier, some notable beginnings have already been made. Yet a more systematic effort toward theorizing on what Sperber (1996) called the “epidemiology of cultural ideas” is justified, insofar as these ideas eventually constitute or complete the mind of people who engage with them. We predict that much mileage would be gained in the near future by focusing on socialization, regional variation, and related phenomena and processes discussed in this chapter.

In all these future endeavors, it will serve us well to be reminded always of the fundamental insight of G. H. Mead and his contemporaries, who argued that self is a system of (often spontaneous) behavioral regulation that is aligned to the symbolic environment of culture. According to this view, the self is simultaneously symbolic and behavioral, cognitive and emotive, and most of all, grounded in biology, yet constantly shaped by culture. Indeed, this view suggests and reinforces the conceptualization of the self as a cultural mode of being. Just as Mead anticipated nearly a century ago, we believe that, if conceptualized this way, the self will continue to be an indispensable anchor in all analyses of the interface between culture, society, and psychology.

NOTES

1. It is ironic that even what may be called “independent” behavior is strongly enforced by societal norms. In North America, for example, there is a strong moral prescription for personal control and autonomy (Lachman & Weaver, 1998). When perceived as failing to meet this cultural standard, one is strongly stigmatized and prejudiced against (Crandall et al., 2002). Nevertheless, it is possible that norms enforcing interdependence are more explicit than those enforcing independence. The latter may be manifest, as in the example earlier, only when violated; typically, they may stay dormant because they are antithetical to the very quality (i.e., freedom from norms) they try to enforce (Garfinkel, 1967).

2. It is of note that an analogous separation between the personal and the public is found in Confucian cultures such as China, Japan, and Korea (Kitayama & Markus, 1999). Because Calvinism and Confucianism may share a strong achievement orientation, a reasonable conjecture is that a tendency to focus on the focal public domain of work might be one marker of such an orientation. However, it should also be kept in mind that specific meanings and practices associated with the work/public and the social relation/private are very different between the two cultural traditions (e.g., Sanchez-Burks & Lee, Chapter 14, this volume).

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II. THEORY AND METHODS

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